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The Dawn of a Judicial Takings Doctrine: 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. 
Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection 
BRENDAN MACKESEY* 
In Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department 
of Environmental Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010), the 
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
the Florida Supreme Court had violated a group of littoral 
property owners’ Fifth Amendment rights—or committed a 
“judicial taking”—by upholding the state of Florida’s 
Beach and Shore Preservation Act. Under the Act, the State 
is entitled to ownership of previously submerged land it re-
stores as beach; this is true even though the normal pri-
vate/state property line, the mean-high water line, is moved 
seaward, and the affected littoral owner(s) lose their right to 
have their property abut the water. Although a four-justice 
plurality led by Justice Scalia held that that the Florida Su-
preme Court did not violate the Fifth Amendment in this in-
stance, the plurality recognized that it is unconstitutional for 
any branch of state government to declare that what was 
once an established private property right no longer exists—
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coastal matters with a focus on beach nourishment and submerged lands owner-
ship. Mr. Mackesey earned his B.B.A., J.D., and M.P.S. (in Marine Affairs) from 
the University of Miami. He is Florida Bar Board Certified in City, County, and 
Local Government Law. Other recent publications include: Brendan Mackesey, 
Preserving the Public Trust: A Voyage Through Florida’s Jurisprudence on Nav-
igable Waters, 50 STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); and Brendan Mackesey, 
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SECTION REP., Oct. 2020, at 1. 
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without providing just compensation. In so doing, the plural-
ity appears to endorse a judicial taking doctrine.  
This Article explores the institutional and policy ramifi-
cations of such a doctrine—ultimately concluding that the 
due process analysis advocated by Justice Kennedy in con-
currence is a better doctrinal mechanism to corral wayward 
judges. After exploring the procedural and federalism con-
cerns raised by a judicial takings doctrine, the Article hy-
pothesizes the viewpoints of several famous deceased tak-
ings scholars. The Article then evaluates the position of liv-
ing taking scholars Eduardo M. Penalver and Lihor Strahi-
levitz, whom propose a flexible approach that considers Tak-
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Can a judge commit a taking? Despite befuddling courts and 
property scholars for years, this deceptively simple question was not 
scrutinized by the U.S. Supreme Court until recently. In Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection,1 a four-justice plurality affirmed that the judiciary 
should be treated like any other state entity under the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment2—implicitly endorsing a “judicial takings” 
doctrine in the process. Although the other four justices3 concurred 
in the judgment of the case, they did not endorse a judicial takings 
doctrine. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg avoided the judicial takings 
question altogether,4 while Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor argued 
that judicial takings should be invalidated under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 
Stop the Beach arose after a group of oceanfront property owners 
in the City of Destin and Walton County challenged Florida’s Beach 
and Shore Preservation Act of 1961 (the “Act”).6 The Act authorized 
the local government to add approximately seventy-five feet of dry 
sand seaward of the mean high-water line (the “MHWL”) across 6.9 
miles of eroded beach.7 To the property owners’ chagrin, this re-
stored beach was to be owned by the state.8 After the property 
 
 1 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 
702 (2010). 
 2 See id. at 715 (“In sum, the Takings Clause bars the State from taking pri-
vate property without paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of 
the taking.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 3 Justice Stevens recused himself from the case. See infra note 137. 
 4 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 742–45 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 5 See id. at 733–42 (Kennedy, J., concurring); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 6 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 710–12; Beach and Shore Preservation Act 
of 1961, FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–.45 (2020). 
 7 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 711. 
 8 See id. 
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owners exhausted their administrative remedies without success,9 
the Florida First District Court of Appeal (the “First DCA”) heard 
the case on direct appeal.10 The First DCA held that the property 
owners were entitled to compensation, but the Florida Supreme 
Court disagreed.11 The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted 
certiorari to determine whether the Florida Supreme Court’s judg-
ment itself constituted a judicial taking or otherwise violated the 
property owners’ due process rights.12 Citing the state’s right to fill 
submerged land and take ownership of land created by avulsion,13 
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Florida Supreme Court’s judg-
ment and found no judicial taking.14 Nevertheless, the plurality was 
crystal-clear that a taking occurs when “a court declares that what 
was once an established right of private property no longer exists.”15 
Unfortunately, the plurality did not expound upon the ramifications 
of this mandate. 
This Article begins with a summary of the major principles and 
landmarks of takings law in Part I. Dicta from the U.S. Supreme 
Court on judicial takings is also explored here. Part II covers the 
history of Stop the Beach and breaks down the opinions of Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer. Part III details the procedural and fed-
eralism concerns raised by a judicial takings doctrine and examines 
the potential for judicial abuse of “background principles” of state 
property law. The part concludes with an argument for due process. 
 
 9 See Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., DOAH Case Nos. 04-
2960/04-3261, 2005 WL 1543209 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hrgs. Jun. 30, 2005) (rec-
ommended order). This recommended order from the Florida Division of Admin-
istrative Hearings was later enforced by the Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection. See Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., DEP Nos. 
DEP:05-0791/04-1370, 2005 WL 1927305 (Fla. Dep’t Env’t Prot. Jul. 27, 2005) 
(final order). 
 10 See Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 27 So. 3d 48 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renour-
ishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach, 560 
U.S. 702. 
 11 Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1121. 
 12 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 707, 712. 
 13 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 730; An avulsion refers to a sudden gain 
or loss of land resulting from the action of water. Avulsion, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 14 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 733. 
 15 Id. at 715 (emphasis omitted). 
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The last part of this Article, Part IV, analyzes an article authored on 
judicial takings by Professors Eduardo M. Peñalver and Lior Strahi-
levitz. 
I.  THE ROAD TO STOP THE BEACH 
A.  The Takings Clause and Substantive Due Process 
A quick review of pertinent constitutional law is necessary. The 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: “No person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law.”16 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment follows 
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”17 Although the Fifth Amendment does not apply di-
rectly to the states, the Fourteenth Amendment—which contains a 
Due Process Clause with similar language to the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause—does.18 Further, the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.19 Thus, the 
states may not take private property for public use without providing 
compensation. 
The Due Process and Takings Clauses both limit the police 
power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.20 Al-
though “insusceptible of strict definition,”21 the police power gener-
ally permits the state to regulate the conduct and property of its cit-
izens for the health, safety, and moral welfare of the public.22 
 
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 17 Id. 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 19 Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236–37 (1897); 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1994); see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 829 (1987). 
 20 See U.S. CONST. amend X. 
 21 CARMAN F. RANDOLPH, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED 
STATES 10 (1894); accord Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) 
(“Except for the substitution of the familiar term of ‘reasonableness,’ the Court 
has generally refrained from announcing any specific criteria [for the police 
power].”). 
 22 See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 6 (1904); see also Noble State 
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111–13 (1911); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 
395, 410–11 (1915); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Miller v. 
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279–80 (1928). 
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Examples of the police power include protecting resources,23 pre-
venting nuisances,24 and enacting zoning ordinances.25 In evaluating 
an exercise of police power, courts usually apply the “rational basis” 
test, which assesses whether the regulation is non-arbitrary and rea-
sonably related to a legitimate public purpose.26 The flexible nature 
of this test makes it difficult to identify concrete limits to the police 
power. As former Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw elo-
quently put it, “[i]t is much easier to perceive and realize the exist-
ence and source of this [police] power, than to mark its boundaries 
or prescribe limits to its exercise.”27 
A regulation may be challenged as an invalid exercise of police 
power under the substantive language of the Due Process Clause.28 
 
 23 Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (navigable 
waters); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (forests). 
 24 Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 411 (air pollution); Miller, 276 U.S. at 278–80 
(tree disease). 
 25 Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (uphold-
ing a zoning ordinance to prevent industry growth); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 
227 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928) (holding zoning ordinance invalid under the Due 
Process Clause). 
 26 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (estab-
lishing rational basis review for economic activity). When the regulation under 
review affects fundamental rights or people classified by race, religion, or national 
origin, “strict” judicial scrutiny applies instead of “rational basis” review. See 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310–11 (1880) (holding that states can-
not prohibit jury service based solely on race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (finding that laws that target a racial group are “immediately 
suspect” and subject to “the most rigid scrutiny”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 
11–12 (1967) (holding that restricting the right to marry based on race is subject 
to the rigid scrutiny); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (explain-
ing that some liberties are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people 
as to be ranked as fundamental and therefore cannot be deprived without compel-
ling justification). Under this heightened level of review, a court asks whether the 
act is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling public purpose. See, e.g., Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Likewise, regulations based on gender and ille-
gitimacy are subject to “intermediate” judicial scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 197–200 (1976). This test asks whether the act is “substantially related 
to an important public interest.” Id. 
 27 RANDOLPH, supra note 21, at 10 (quoting Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 
Mass. 53, 85 (1851)); see also CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW 3 (Alan T. Acker-
man & Darius W. Dynkowski eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“The concept of public welfare 
is broad and inclusive . . . .” (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954))). 
 28 TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES 6 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002). 
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The merit of such claims has fluctuated with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s stance on substantive due process. Initially, the Court corre-
lated substantive due process protections with vested property inter-
ests.29 In the early twentieth century, the Court moved towards the 
“liberty” end of the due process spectrum, protecting employers’ 
rights to establish employee wages and working conditions.30 How-
ever, the harsh economic realities of the Great Depression eventu-
ally convinced the Supreme Court to defer to the legislature on such 
employment matters.31 Consequently, the Court ceased applying the 
Due Process Clause to economic regulation.32 A popular criticism 
of Justice Kennedy’s due process approach is that it would signal a 
return to the Lochner era of the early twentieth century, as property 
law typically involves some form of economic regulation.33 Never-
theless, the Court continues to rely on the Due Process Clause to 
protect “fundamental” individual rights, including property inter-
ests.34 
 
 29 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 449–52 (1857) 
(finding that slaves were a vested property interest), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 30 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down a state 
statute prescribing employee hours); Adkins v. Child.’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561–
62 (1923) (rejecting federal minimum wage legislation for women). 
 31 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) (“We 
may take judicial notice of the unparalleled demands for relief which arose during 
the recent period of depression and still continue to an alarming extent.”). 
 32 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (“[C]ourts do not sub-
stitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.”). 
 33 See Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, 
Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 419 (2001) 
(“To rely on due process would risk resuscitating one of the most discredited doc-
trines in the Court’s history—the repudiated Lochner view that substantive due 
process limits government economic regulation.”). 
 34 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees a defendant who would be entitled to a jury trial in 
federal court the right to a jury trial in state court); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 204–05 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the Due Process Clause creates an affirmative duty for the state to protect children 
from abuse); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding that the right to 
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment extends to a woman’s right to choose 
whether to have an abortion); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 
520–21 (1977) (invalidating a housing code provision that restricted which family 
 
2021] THE DAWN OF A JUDICIAL TAKINGS DOCTRINE 805 
 
B.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Takings Jurisprudence 
After the Supreme Court stopped analyzing economic regulation 
under the Due Process Clause, it found another avenue to attack such 
regulation affecting property rights: a regulatory takings doctrine. In 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,35 Justice Holmes proclaimed that 
a regulation that “goes too far” may constitute a taking.36 The only 
measuring stick Holmes provided was the “extent of diminution” of 
the property value.37 Holmes did not clarify when the judiciary 
should invalidate a regulation under the Due Process Clause as op-
posed to order the government to pay compensation under the Tak-
ings Clause.38 In practice, Mahon prevented the government from 
dodging compensation by regulating property rather than seizing it. 
About fifty years later in Penn Central Transportation Agency 
v. New York City,39 the Court finally added some substance to its 
regulatory takings doctrine. Endorsing a judicial ad hoc factual in-
quiry into state property legislation, Justice Brennan set forth a test 
(the “Penn Central Test”) weighing the (1) character of the govern-
ment action and (2) economic effect of the regulation on the prop-
erty owner; particularly the extent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with any “distinct investment-backed expectations.”40 By per-
mitting judges to evaluate the merits of property regulation, the 
Court blurred the line between the Takings and Due Process 
Clauses. Consequently, it is not always clear whether a regulation 
should be viewed as an act of eminent domain requiring compensa-
tion or an invalid exercise of police power.41 Notably, however, in 
 
members could live together under substantive due process); Goldblatt v. Town 
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (upholding a town mining ordinance as 
a valid exercise of the police power). 
 35 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 36 Id. at 415. 
 37 Id. at 413. 
 38 Id. at 415 (discussing both the Due Process Clause and Takings Clause but 
offering no clear indication of when the judiciary should invalidate a regulation 
under either Clause). 
 39 Penn Cent. Transp. Agency v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 40 Id. at 124–25. 
 41 Compare First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County 
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314–15 (1987) (compensation is due for temporary 
taking resulting from a zoning ordinance), with Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 
255, 261 (1980) (applying an ad hoc balancing test to a zoning ordinance). 
806 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:798 
 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,42 the Court discounted the role sub-
stantive due process plays in regulatory takings analysis.43 Speaking 
for the majority, Justice O’Connor emphasized the deference courts 
should give to legislative judgments.44 Property owners seeking re-
dress for the burden imposed on their property by a state action may 
not seek to invalidate the state action—they may only seek compen-
sation for it; a due process challenge to the efficacy of a regulation 
is a wholly distinguishable, separate action.45 
The Penn Central test has been relied upon and tinkered with by 
the U.S. Supreme Court for many years now.46 It is arguably the 
most important takings case in U.S. history. That said, no case has 
been more important to the rise of judicial takings than Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council.47 In Lucas, the Court held that the 
state may restrict private property use without compensation as long 
as the restriction accords with “background principles” of state 
property and nuisance law.48 As discussed later in this Article, illu-
sory “background principles” are the common foundation for a ju-
dicial taking.49 However, the most immediate and practical conse-
quence of Lucas resulted from the Court ’s clarification that a per se 
taking occurs when a property owner is deprived of all economically 
 
 42 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 43 Id. at 540 (“We conclude that this formula prescribes an inquiry in the na-
ture of a due process, not a takings, test, and that it has no proper place in our 
takings jurisprudence.”). Justice Kennedy submitted a brief concurrence “to note 
that today’s decision does not foreclose the possibility that a regulation might be 
so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process.” Id. at 548 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). 
 44 See id. at 545 (majority opinion). 
 45 See id. at 536–37. 
 46 See, e.g., Agins, 447 U.S. at 260–62 (applying a modified two-step Penn 
Central balancing test, asking whether the regulation (1) substantially advances a 
state interest, and (2) deprives the owner economically viable use of his land). 
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545 (rejecting the Agins test in favor of the Penn Central test); 
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342 
(2002) (rejecting a per se taking rule and favoring the Penn Central test for tem-
porary takings). 
 47 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 48 Id. at 1029. The logic is that such property use was never part of the 
owner’s title to begin with. Id. For an in-depth discussion of background princi-
ples see TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES, supra note 28, at 163–79. 
 49 See infra Part III.C. 
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beneficial use of his land.50 Indeed, nine years later in Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island,51 the Court denied a per se taking had occurred be-
cause the affected parcel retained approximately six percent of its 
total value.52 
The Court affirmed the “deprivation of all economically benefi-
cial use” per se taking standard in Lingle.53 There, Justice O’Connor 
iterated that the only other instance when a per se taking occurs is 
where the government physically invades private property.54 (Ac-
cording to O’Connor, other takings claims must be analyzed under 
Penn Central.55) In Stop the Beach, Justice Scalia seemed to identify 
a third per se takings standard, where “[the state] recharacterize[s] 
as public property what was previously private property.”56 This 
standard is the premise for the judicial takings doctrine raised by the 
Stop the Beach plurality.57 
 
 50 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
 51 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 52 See id. at 616. The Court did, however, remand the case to apply a Penn 
Central test. Id. at 632. 
 53 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005). 
 54 See id. at 547–48. For precedent establishing the “physical invasion” per 
se taking standard, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 438, 441(1982) (holding that negligible cable installation equipment consti-
tutes a permanent physical invasion of property and is therefore a taking). See also 
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967) 
(discussing “physical invasion” per se taking standard). 
 55 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548. The only other exception is land-use exactions, 
which are analyzed under a two-step test established in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (proposing the “essential nexus” requirement between 
the condition imposed on development and state interest advanced by the re-
striction); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (describing the “rough proportionality” require-
ment between the condition imposed and the estimated impact of the proposed 
development). 
 56 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 
U.S. 702, 713 (2010) (“States effect a taking if they recharacterize as public prop-
erty what was previously private property.” (citing Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, 
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163–65 (1980))). 
 57 To compare a state “recharacterizing as public property what was previ-
ously private property,” id., with “declar[ing] what was once an established right 
of private property no longer exists,” see supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
These are very similar actions. 
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C.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Historic Approach to Judicial 
Takings 
The Supreme Court first hinted at the idea of a judicial taking in 
Muhlker v. New York & Harlem Railroad Co.58 A four-justice plu-
rality enounced that state courts can declare or modify property law 
as they see fit but cannot divest one’s contractual rights (under the 
Contracts Clause of the Constitution) in the process.59 However, 
four dissenting justices argued that property law was a “construction 
of the courts” that can be changed regardless of constitutional re-
strictions.60 Consequently, Muhlker did not create any strong prece-
dent for judicial takings.61 
Around the 1930s, the Court released a series of opinions sug-
gesting that judicial changes in the law cannot violate the Takings 
Clause. In Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan,62 the Court reasoned that be-
cause no constitutional issue arises when a state court defines prop-
erty, no constitutional issue arises when a state court re-defines 
property.63 Therefore, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to hear 
such cases.64 The Court reconciled its decision with Muhlker—
which involved a similar contractual right of property enjoyment—
by pointing out that the Muhlker plaintiff’s rights had been impaired 
by a state statute.65 Thus, the constitutional protections of the Con-
tracts Clause only apply to legislative acts, not judicial decisions.66 
In Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,67 the Court re-
versed a state court ruling that abruptly altered state jurisdiction over 
administrative manners, thereby depriving the plaintiff of a forum 
 
 58 See Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 554, 570 (1905). The Su-
preme Court had already established that the Takings Clause applies to judicial 
action. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–35 
(1897). However, the Quincy Railroad court did not address whether the Takings 
Clause applies when the judiciary actually changes property law. See id. 
 59 Muhlker, 197 U.S. at 570. 
 60 Id. at 572–74 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 61 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1465 
(1990) (“Faced with internal disagreement on judicial takings, the Court pro-
ceeded to waffle on the issue for several decades.”). 
 62 Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924). 
 63 See id. at 452–53, 455. 
 64 Id. at 455–56. 
 65 Id. at 452–53. 
 66 See id. at 450–51. 
 67 Brinkerhoff-Faris Tr. & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930). 
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to challenge a property tax.68 Because the plaintiff was deprived of 
an opportunity to be heard, however, the Court had only rectified a 
procedural due process violation.69 Justice Brandeis underscored 
that “[s]tate courts . . . may [still] ordinarily overrule their own de-
cisions without offending constitutional guarantees, even though 
parties may have acted to their prejudice on the faith of the earlier 
decisions.”70 Two years later, in Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sun-
burst Oil & Refining Co.,71 Justice Cardozo emphasized that state 
courts are entitled to “adhere[] to precedent” however they see fit.72 
According to Cardozo, nothing in the Constitution prevents a state 
court from retroactively applying a new statute or rule of law to a 
prior decision.73 Read together, Tidal Oil, Brinkerhoff, and Great 
Northern Railway seem to discard any notion of judicial takings that 
can be gleaned from Muhlker. 
It wasn’t until 1967 that Justice Stewart would single-handedly 
revive the judicial takings concept. In Hughes v. Washington,74 the 
Court granted certiorari to determine ownership of an accretion75 
between a littoral property owner and the state.76 The Washington 
Supreme Court overruled precedent favoring the property owner by 
granting the accretion to the state, claiming that any private right to 
the accretion was forfeited when the state adopted its constitution in 
1889.77 By abruptly interpreting the state constitution to override es-
tablished precedent, the Washington Supreme Court essentially 
“changed” state property law.78 The U.S. Supreme Court majority 
reversed the judgment, but dodged the judicial takings question by 
holding that accretion ownership is controlled by federal law, which 
dictates that property owners are entitled to accretions.79 In a 
 
 68 Id. at 675–78. 
 69 Id. at 681–82. 
 70 Id. at 681 n.8. 
 71 Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refin. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). 
 72 See id. at 364. 
 73 Id. at 364–65. 
 74 Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967). 
 75 In the context of property law, accretion refers to the gradual accumulation 
of land by natural forces. Accretion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 76 Hughes, 389 U.S. at 290–91. 
 77 Id. at 291. 
 78 Id. at 297 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 79 Id. at 291, 294 (majority opinion). 
810 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:798 
 
concurring opinion, Justice Stewart argued that the ownership ques-
tion in Hughes—like all real property issues—should be decided un-
der state law.80 Stewart further explained that constitutional safe-
guards prevent state courts from abruptly abrogating established 
property rights: 
To the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court 
of Washington . . . arguably conforms to reasonable 
expectations, we must of course accept it as conclu-
sive. But to the extent that it constitutes a sudden 
change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the rel-
evant precedents, no such deference would be appro-
priate. For a State cannot be permitted to defeat the 
constitutional prohibition against taking property 
without due process of law by the simple device of 
asserting retroactively that the property it has taken 
never existed at all.81 
Despite Justice Stewart ’s overture, the Supreme Court continued 
to evade the judicial takings question.82 In 1993, Justice Stewart’s 
concurrence in Hughes was affirmatively cited by Justice Scalia 
(with Justice O’Connor) in dissent from the Court’s denial of certi-
orari in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach.83 Stevens featured a littoral 
property owner that was denied a permit to construct a seawall.84 
The Oregon Supreme Court relied on the custom of the public’s right 
to beach access as a “background principle[]” under Lucas to uphold 
the permit denial.85 Scalia was skeptical of this reasoning, citing the 
 
 80 Id. at 295 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Surely it must be conceded as a gen-
eral proposition that the law of real property is, under our Constitution, left to the 
individual States to develop and administer.”). 
 81 Id. at 296–97 (emphasis added). 
 82 See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994); Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 331 
(1973) (quoting Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Hughes but finding it “unneces-
sary” to resolve the “serious constitutional issue” posed by judicial takings). 
 83 See Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Hughes, 
389 U.S. at 296–97 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
 84 Stevens, 854 P.2d at 451. 
 85 See id. at 453–57. The Oregon Supreme Court relied on State ex rel. 
Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969), where it established that “[t]he custom 
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Oregon Supreme Court ’s dubious and inconsistent record of defin-
ing the custom in similar contexts.86 Scalia seemed to imply that the 
Oregon Supreme Court had applied the custom doctrine as a means 
to an end for judgment. According to Scalia, “Lucas . . . would be a 
nullity if anything that a state court chooses to denominate ‘back-
ground law’—regardless of whether it is really such—could elimi-
nate property rights.”87 Despite never being heard by the Court, Ste-
vens had laid the foundation for the Stop the Beach plurality opinion 
seventeen years later. 
Before hearing Stop the Beach, however, the Supreme Court 
heard several other cases involving apparent judicial takings. Prune-
yard Shopping Center v. Robbins88 featured a group of students ex-
cluded from petitioning in a public shopping center.89 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court overturned precedent by holding that the state 
constitution required the shopping centers to permit petitioners on 
their premises.90 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, 
concluding that no taking occurred because the petitioning did not 
unreasonably impair the value or use of the shopping center.91 By 
subjecting the California Supreme Court’s judgment to the standard 
Penn Central analysis, the Court seemed to dismiss the notion of 
any distinction between legislative and judicial takings. Indeed, 
Scalia argues as much in Stop the Beach.92 
 
of the people of Oregon to use the dry-sand area of the beaches for public recrea-
tional purposes meets every one of Blackstone’s requisites [for establishing a cus-
tom]” and that denying beachfront property owners the right to develop the “dry-
sand” portion of their land “takes from no man anything which he has had a legit-
imate reason to regard as exclusively his.” Thornton, 462 P.2d at 677–78. To be 
sure, Thornton poses a judicial takings question in its own right. See Stevens, 510 
U.S. at 1212 & nn.4–5 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s application of the custom doctrine); W. David Sarratt, Judicial Takings 
and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV. 1487, 1487–88 (2004) (introducing the 
article with a discussion of Thornton). 
 86 See Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1208–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 87 Id. at 1211. 
 88 Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 89 Id. at 77. 
 90 Id. at 78. 
 91 Id. at 83. 
 92 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 
U.S. 702, 714 (2010) (“Our precedents provide no support for the proposition that 
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The same year Pruneyard was decided, the Court issued another 
opinion, Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,93 implic-
itly equating legislative and judicial takings. In Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies, the Court reviewed the Florida Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of a state statute assigning interest generated from an in-
terpleader fund.94 The Florida Supreme Court had reasoned that be-
cause the fund is considered “public money” until it leaves the cir-
cuit court’s account, any interest the fund generates belongs to the 
county.95 The Court, however, found that in departing from the 
“long established general rule” that interest in such accounts is clas-
sified as private property,96 the Florida Supreme Court had effected 
a taking.97 Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies illustrates that the Court 
will not tolerate the judiciary “transform[ing] private property into 
public property without compensation.”98 To reinforce this point, 
the Court granted certiorari to review the Florida Supreme Court ’s 
decision in Stop the Beach.99 
II.  THE HISTORY OF STOP THE BEACH 
A.  The First District Court of Appeal Opinion 
In 1995, Hurricane Opal swept through the gulf coast of Florida 
and critically eroded beaches along the City of Destin (the “City”) 
and Walton County (the “County”).100 The City and County then 
 
takings effected by the judicial branch are entitled to special treatment, and in fact 
suggest to the contrary.”). 
 93 Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). 
 94 Id. at 155–56. 
 95 Id. at 158–59. 
 96 Id. at 162–63. 
 97 Id. at 164 (“Neither the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the Florida 
courts by judicial decree, may accomplish the result the county seeks simply by 
recharacterizing the principal as ‘public money’ because it is held temporarily by 
the court.” (emphasis added)). Just as in Pruneyard, the Court analyzed the case 
under Penn Central. See id. 
 98 Id.; see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 
560 U.S. 702, 714, 715 (2010); RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 12 n.17 (1985). 
 99 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 712. 
 100 See Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 50 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Walton County v. Stop the Beach 
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initiated a lengthy administrative process to restore the beaches (the 
“Project”) that culminated in July 2003 when they filed for a Joint 
Coastal Permit.101 A year later, the Florida Department of Environ-
mental Protection (the “Department”) released a notice of intent to 
issue the permit.102 Two groups of affected oceanfront property 
owners, Save Our Beaches, Inc. and Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
Inc., each petitioned for an administrative hearing to challenge the 
Project.103 The property owners disputed ownership of the restored 
beach, which the State planned to open to the public.104 In June 
2005, the cases were consolidated and heard by the Florida Division 
of Administrative Hearings.105 The Department followed the Ad-
ministrative Board’s recommendation to issue the Joint Coastal per-
mit, and the property owners appealed to the First DCA.106 
At issue before the First DCA was whether the Department un-
constitutionally applied Florida’s Beach and Shore Preservation Act 
(the “Act”).107 Passed in 1961, the Act endorses “beach restoration 
and nourishment projects,” whereby sand is deposited and main-
tained on eroded beaches.108 Once a restoration project is approved, 
an erosion control line (the “ECL”) is fixed according to the present 
 
Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach, 
560 U.S. 702. 
 101 Id. The permit proposed dredging sand along the beach to redistribute it in 
accordance with a planned design. Id. at 50–51. 
 102 Id. at 51. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See id.; Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1106–07, 1109 (“The State holds the 
fore-shore in trust for its people for the purposes of navigation, fishing and bath-
ing.” (quoting White v. Hughes, 190 So. 446, 449 (Fla. 1939))). 
 105 Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 51; see Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Env’t Prot., DOAH Case Nos. 04-2960/04-3261, 2005 WL 1543209 (Fla. Div. 
Admin. Hrgs. Jun. 30, 2005) (recommended order); Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. 
Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., DEP Nos. DEP:05-0791/04-1370, 2005 WL 1927305 
(Fla. Dep’t Env’t Prot. Jul. 27, 2005) (final order). 
 106 Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 50. The Department issued a final order 
validating the permit in July 2005. Id. at 51. The property owners did not appeal 
the Administrative Board’s finding that the project would not adversely affect 
water quality standards. Id. 
 107 Id. at 50; Beach and Shore Preservation Act of 1961, FLA. STAT. 
§§ 161.011–.45 (2020). 
 108 FLA. STAT. § 161.088 (2020); see also FLA. STAT. § 161.021(3)–(4) 
(2020). 
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MHWL.109 This ECL replaces the MHWL as the boundary between 
state and private property.110 Significantly, the MHWL (unlike the 
ECL) fluctuates with accretion and erosion.111 Thus, when beach 
restoration efforts move the MHWL seaward, property owners do 
not attain any new land.112 Rather, the state holds title to the new 
strip of beach that abuts the ocean.113 
After the district court dismissed Save Our Beaches’ appeal for 
lack of standing, it proceeded to analyze the littoral rights of the 
members of Stop the Beach Renourishment.114 According to the 
court’s interpretation of the Florida Constitution, title to littoral 
property inheres that such property extends to the MHWL.115 The 
court supported this reading by citing several Florida cases that em-
phasized the importance of this rule.116 The court also pointed out 
that the Project would cause the property owners to lose their right 
to have their property abut the water.117 The right to ingress and 
egress to the ocean—which is preserved by the Act118—did not suf-
ficiently preserve the property owners’ littoral rights.119 Accord-
ingly, in April 2006, the First DCA reversed the Department ’s order 
 
 109 FLA. STAT. § 161.191(2) (2020). 
 110 FLA. STAT. § 161.191(1) (2020). 
 111 See Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 59. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See id. 
 114 See id. at 56–60. Unlike the 6 individual members of Stop the Beach Re-
nourishment, the 150 members of Save Our Beaches did not all own property in 
the Project zone. Id. at 55–56; see also Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renour-
ishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1106 n.5 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010). 
 115 Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 58 (“The title to lands under navigable 
waters, within the boundaries of the state, which have not been alienated, includ-
ing beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the state . . . .” (quoting FLA. 
CONST. art. X, § 11)). 
 116 Id. at 58 (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. 
Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); 
Bd. Of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 
So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987); Teat v. City of Apalachicola, 738 So. 2d 413, 414 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 117 See Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 60 (“Florida’s law is clear that [littoral] 
rights cannot be severed from [littoral] uplands absent an agreement with the [lit-
toral] owner, not even by the power of eminent domain.”). 
 118 FLA. STAT. § 161.201 (2020). 
 119 Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 59. 
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to issue the Joint Coastal Permit,120 and the Department appealed to 
the Florida Supreme Court.121 
B.  The Florida Supreme Court Opinion 
Noting that the district court had certified the takings question 
to be of “great public importance,” the Florida Supreme Court 
agreed to hear the case two years later.122 The Florida Supreme 
Court determined that the case presented a facial challenge to the 
Act, and rephrased the issue as follows: “On its face, does the Beach 
and Shore Preservation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland own-
ers of littoral rights without just compensation?”123 Before delving 
into its analysis, the court accentuated the State’s property rights. 
The court emphasized that Florida has a “constitutional duty to pro-
tect [its] beaches, part of which it holds ‘in trust for all the peo-
ple.’”124 
Although the court acknowledged several exclusive littoral 
rights, it distinguished the right to accretion as a future interest con-
tingent upon accretion occurring.125 According to the court, how-
ever, the beach restoration endorsed by the Act does not constitute 
accretion; rather, it is a public remedy to avulsion.126 Under Florida 
law, the boundary between state and private property remains the 
MHWL before the “avulsive event” occurred.127 Significantly, the 
Act dictates that the impact of avulsion on the existing MHWL be 
 
 120 Id. at 60. 
 121 See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 
1102, 1105 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. 
Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010). 
 122 Id. at 1105. The certified question had asked whether the Act was uncon-
stitutionally applied to grant the permit at Stop the Beach Renourishment’s ex-
pense. Id. 
 123 Id. (citations omitted). In dissent, Judge Wells argued that the court should 
treat this case as an applied constitutional challenge because the district court 
treated it as such. Id. at 1121 (Wells, J., dissenting). 
 124 Id. at 1110–11 (majority opinion) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11). 
 125 Id. at 1112.  
 126 See id. at 1119 (“[T]he common law rule of accretion . . . is not implicated 
in the context of this Act.”); id. at 1116 (“The doctrine of avulsion is pivotal be-
cause, under that doctrine, the public has the right to reclaim its land lost by an 
avulsive event.”). 
 127 Id. at 1114. 
816 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:798 
 
taken into account when delineating the ECL.128 Therefore, on its 
face, the Act does not unconstitutionally deprive property owners of 
any land they possessed before the avulsive event occurred.129 As 
the court acknowledged, however, it is not clear whether the state 
took Hurricane Opal into account when delineating the ECL here.130 
By restricting its analysis to the facial constitutionality of the Act, 
the court dodged this question altogether. 
In upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the court rejected 
the notion of any littoral right to have one’s property abut the wa-
ter.131 According to the court, such a right is ancillary to the littoral 
right of access to the water.132 Therefore, contrary to the district 
court’s contentions, the preserved right of ingress and egress to the 
ocean did sufficiently preserve the property owners’  littoral 
rights.133 This point was vigorously argued in dissent by Justice 
Lewis, who proclaimed that “[i]n this State, the legal essence of lit-
toral or riparian land is contact with the water.”134 Lewis explained 
that, while the barrier of state land between private land and the wa-
ter may only be a few yards here, nothing in the majority opinion 
restricts the barrier from being “hundreds or even thousands of 
yards” in other instances.135 Indeed, the precedent in Florida appears 
to be set: Oceanfront property need not extend to the ocean to main-
tain its littoral status. 
C. The U.S. Supreme Court Opinion 
Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to 
resolve any issues of Florida property law. The Court, rather, 
granted certiorari to determine whether “the Florida Supreme 
Court’s decision itself effected a taking of the [Stop the Beach Re-
nourishment] Members’  littoral rights contrary to the Fifth and 
 
 128 Id. at 1117. 
 129 Id. (“In light of this common law doctrine of avulsion, the provisions of 
the Beach and Shore Preservation Act at issue are facially constitutional.”). 
 130 Id. at 1117 n.15. 
 131 See id. at 1119. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 1122 (Lewis, J., dissenting). 
 135 Id. at 1126. 
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Fourteenth Amendments.”136 Justice Scalia was joined by the en-
tirety of the Court in ruling for the state, but only Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justices Thomas and Alito joined the sections of Scalia’s 
opinion addressing judicial takings.137 Justices Kennedy and Breyer 
each authored separate concurring opinions to address their stance 
on judicial takings.138 Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg joined Ken-
nedy and Breyer respectively in these concurrences.139 
1.  JUSTICE SCALIA’S PLURALITY OPINION 
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the State had not 
taken Stop the Beach Renourishment members’ property.140 The 
property owners relied on Board of Trustees of the Internal Improve-
ment Trust Fund v. Sand Key Associates, Ltd.,141 which held that 
that the artificial nature of an accretion does not alter the littoral right 
to accretion in Florida.142 The Court, however, deferred to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court ’s determination that the Act implicated avulsion, 
not accretion.143 In Florida, submerged land seaward of the MHWL 
that becomes exposed by an avulsion belongs to the State.144 
 
 136 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 
702, 712 (2010). The Court declined to address the property owners’ other two 
claims: (1) the Project—not just the Florida Supreme Court opinion—constituted 
a taking; and (2) the Act was a deprivation of property without due process. Id. at 
729 n.11; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. 
702 (2010) (No. 08-1151). 
 137 Id. at 705. Justice Stevens recused himself because he owns littoral prop-
erty in Florida. D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 903, 904 (2011). 
 138 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 733–742 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 742–
45 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 139 Id. at 733 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 742 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 140 Id. at 733 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 141 Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 
Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1987). 
 142 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 732 (citing Sand Key, 512 So. 2d at 937–38). 
 143 See id. at 732. Unlike the Florida Supreme Court, which focused on the 
beach loss resulting from Hurricane Opal as the pertinent avulsion, the U.S. Su-
preme Court characterized the beach restoration efforts as the avulsion warranting 
analysis. Accord Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 
2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. 
Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 116–17 (2010). 
 144 See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1116–17 (citing Bryant v. Peppe, 238 
So. 2d 836, 838–39 (Fla. 1970)). 
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Applying this principle, the Court reasoned that the State is entitled 
to land recovered by beach restoration.145 To justify state action 
(beach restoration) as a qualifying avulsion, the Court relied on 
Martin v. Busch,146 which suggests that artificial avulsions are 
treated no differently than natural avulsions in Florida.147 The Court 
also rejected the property owners’  claim that the Florida Supreme 
Court “took” their right to have their property abut the water.148 Af-
ter affirming that the right to contact is ancillary to the right to access 
in Florida, Scalia offers a sneak peek of the plurality’s new judicial 
takings doctrine in action: “One cannot say that the Florida Supreme 
Court contravened established property law by rejecting it.”149 
Scalia is blunt in his judicial takings analysis.150 Citing cases 
such as Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies and Pruneyard, Scalia dis-
misses any conceivable precedent for the idea that a taking effected 
by the judiciary should be treated any differently than a taking ef-
fected by the legislature.151 Rather, it is a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment for any branch of state government to declare that an 
established private property right no longer exists.152 Scalia there-
fore reasons that a judicial decision can abrogate private property 
rights just as state appropriation or regulation can.153 Although 
Scalia tries to downplay the significance of this assertion, a poten-
tially groundbreaking new doctrine had just been affirmed by a Su-
preme Court plurality with shockingly little analysis.154 
 
 145 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 730–31. 
 146 Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 287 (Fla. 1927) (holding that state owns 
previously submerged land in a lakebed that state owns and drains). 
 147 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 730–31 (citing Martin, 112 So. 274 at 87–
88). 
 148 Id. at 732–33.  
 149 Id. at 733. 
 150 See id. at 713–15. 
 151 See id. at 714–15. 
 152 Id. at 715 (“[T]he Takings Clause bars the State from taking private prop-
erty without paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the tak-
ing . . . . [Th]e particular state actor is irrelevant.”). 
 153 See id. 
 154 This is certainly not the first Scalia opinion that fails to clarify a legal stand-
ard. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412–13 (2012) (holding that 
the warrantless use of a tracking device on a motor vehicle constitutes a search 
under the Fourth Amendment but failing to clarify whether the Court was actually 
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Rather than discussing the nuances and ramifications of a judi-
cial takings doctrine, Scalia took time to criticize Kennedy and 
Breyer.155 Scalia accuses both Justices of the same logical fallacy: 
“conclud[ing] that the Florida Supreme Court’s action here does not 
meet the standard for a judicial taking, while purporting not to de-
termine what is the standard for a judicial taking, or indeed whether 
such a thing as a judicial taking even exists.”156 Clearly, Scalia was 
not enamored with the judicial restraint exhibited by the concurring 
justices. Kennedy’s push for due process likewise elicits Scalia ’s 
wrath. Specifically, Scalia denounces Kennedy for overlooking 
clear precedent, betraying the Court ’s policy of not applying sub-
stantive due process to economic rights, misconstruing the framers’ 
intent, and proposing an illusory substitute for the Takings Clause 
without limits to guide the Court.157 
Scalia also spends plenty of time on the defensive. Notably, 
Scalia labels the procedural obstacles to judicial takings as “nonex-
istent [and] insignificant.”158 Scalia also systematically and some-
what abrasively dismisses the federalism concerns advanced by the 
State, including the federal courts’ knowledge of state law, the com-
mon law’s need for flexibility, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s 
requirement that lower federal courts not review state court deci-
sions unless specifically authorized by Congress to do so.159 An 
overarching theme of criticism directed at a judicial takings doctrine 
is that federal courts should not be defining state property rights; yet, 
according to Scalia, “the test [the plurality has] adopted . . . contains 
within itself a considerable degree of deference to state courts.”160 
Justice Breyer was not convinced. 
 
articulating a new test for government trespasses); District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that a D.C. law violated the Second Amend-
ment but refusing to articulate a standard for future challenges to gun regulations). 
 155 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 719–25. 
 156 Id. at 719. 
 157 See id. at 719–25. 
 158 Id. at 723. 
 159 See id. at 726–27 (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 
(1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983)). 
 160 Id. at 726 n.9. 
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2.  JUSTICE BREYER’S CONCURRENCE 
Breyer ’s brief concurrence is an archetype of judicial restraint. 
Because no judicial taking occurred here, Breyer did not see the 
point in validating a judicial takings doctrine.161 Although he stops 
short of criticizing the constitutional theory behind the doctrine, 
Breyer questions whether federal courts could effectively imple-
ment it.162 Breyer accurately adverts that judicial takings claims will 
turn on property rights of “considerable complexity” traditionally 
left for the states.163 Moreover, the federal courts will be overrun 
with takings challenges from nonparties to state court cases who 
nevertheless allege they are adversely impacted by that state court’s 
decision.164 Breyer also succinctly responds to Scalia’s admonish-
ment of his judicial restraint by reminding the plurality that “courts 
frequently find it possible to resolve cases—even those raising con-
stitutional questions—without specifying the precise standard under 
which a party wins or loses.”165 Justice Kennedy echoes this senti-
ment in his concurrence166 but also challenges the merit of the plu-
rality ’s judicial takings doctrine while presenting an intriguing alter-
native in the process. 
3.  JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRENCE 
Kennedy’s concurrence strikes a careful balance between cri-
tiquing the Takings Clause and promoting the Due Process Clause. 
Prognosticating that a judicial takings doctrine would essentially al-
low the judiciary to exercise the power of eminent domain,167 Ken-
nedy argues that the power to abrogate property rights should be left 
 
 161 See id. at 744–45 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In the past, Members of this 
Court have warned us that, when faced with difficult constitutional questions, we 
should ‘confine ourselves to deciding only what is necessary to the disposition of 
the immediate case.’” (quoting Whitehouse v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 349 U.S. 366, 373 
(1955))). 
 162 See id. at 743–44. 
 163 Id. at 743–44. 
 164 See id. at 743. 
 165 Id. at 744. 
 166 See id. at 733–34 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“As Justice Breyer ob-
serves . . . this case does not require the Court to determine whether, or when, a 
judicial decision determining the rights of property owners can violate the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”). 
 167 See id. at 739. 
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to political branches that are qualified to evaluate the necessity and 
utility of regulatory action branches.168 Moreover, subjecting the 
courts to the Taking Clause may actually encourage judicial 
changes in property law: Courts will be confident that new rules will 
be upheld as takings (with compensation granted), rather than inval-
idated under due process.169 Kennedy also expresses apprehension 
over the procedure for raising a judicial takings claim and the rem-
edies available.170 May the claim be raised on appeal or in a separate 
suit?171 Is compensation to the aggrieved party mandated and, if so, 
by the courts or the legislature?172 Kennedy warns the plurality that 
by “reach[ing] beyond the necessities of the case to recognize a ju-
dicial takings doctrine,” the Court must now resolve these intricate 
issues in the future.173 
To avoid these issues, Kennedy proposes that the Court rely on 
the Due Process Clause to rectify judicial takings. More specifically, 
Kennedy contends that federal courts should invalidate state court 
decisions that substantially alter or eliminate established property 
rights by finding them “arbitrary or irrational” under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.174 Kennedy reminds the Court that it has a long history 
of invalidating property regulation under the Due Process Clause, 
which already dissuades and ultimately prevents state courts from 
“abandon[ing] settled principles” of the common law.175 Moreover, 
assessing whether a judicial decision is “arbitrary or irrational” is no 
more difficult than assessing whether a judicial decision has altered 
 
 168 See id. at 735 (“[A]s a matter of custom and practice, these [decisions made 
in exercising eminent domain] are matters for the political branches—the legisla-
ture and the executive—not the courts.”); id. at 736 (“Courts, unlike the executive 
or legislature, are not designed to make policy decisions about the ‘need for, and 
likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions.’”) (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005))). 
 169 See id. at 738–39. 
 170 See id. at 740. Scalia explains that the Court would not mandate compen-
sation if it determined that a judicial taking occurred here. See id. at 723–24 (ma-
jority opinion). Rather, it would give the state legislature the choice to pay com-
pensation or decline to complete the Project. See id. 
 171 See id. at 740 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 172 See id. at 740–41. 
 173 Id. 741–42. 
 174 Id. at 737. 
 175 See id. at 735–738. 
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or eliminated an established property right.176 Thus, Kennedy finds 
it natural and practicable to apply the Due Process Clause to judicial 
takings.177 So does this Article’s author. 
III.  COMMENT ON THE DRAWBACKS OF A JUDICIAL TAKINGS 
DOCTRINE AND THE BENEFITS OF DUE PROCESS 
A.  Procedural Concerns Raised by a Judicial Takings 
Doctrine 
The greatest problem with the judicial takings doctrine proposed 
in Stop the Beach is that it is not clear how it will overcome the 
procedural hurdles it faces. Although Stop the Beach involved a 
state actor and a private party, other disputes between private liti-
gants may also raise the judicial takings question. Take a hypothet-
ical instance of adverse possession. If a state supreme court radically 
alters the common law by holding that X has acquired ownership of 
a tract on Y ’s property through adverse possession, it would seem to 
have declared that Y’s clearly established property right no longer 
exists. According to Scalia, Y’s only option to raise a judicial taking 
claim is through petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.178 However, suppose that numerous other landowners (“L”) 
in the state now face similar claims from their own adverse posses-
sors (“A”), or are concerned that the state court’s ruling terminated 
their property rights. Several difficult questions arise. 
Has the door to federal court been opened for L to file a judicial 
takings claim? Scalia suggests as much, equating a judicial takings 
claim to any other takings claim.179 Until recently, however, the 
door to federal court for takings claims remained nearly closed. As 
 
 176 See id. at 737 (“The objection that a due process claim might involve close 
questions concerning whether a judicial decree extends beyond what owners 
might have expected is not a sound argument; for the same close questions would 
arise to whether a judicial decision is a taking.”). 
 177 Id. at 736 (“It is thus natural to read the Due Process Clause as limiting the 
power of courts to eliminate or change established property rights.”).  
 178 See id. at 727 (majority opinion). 
 179 See id. at 728 (“[W]here the claimant was not a party to the original suit, 
he would be able to challenge in federal court the [judicial] taking effected by the 
state supreme-court opinion to the same extent that he would be able to challenge 
[a legislative or executive taking] in federal court . . . .”). 
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the U.S. Supreme Court stated in the 2005 case San Remo Hotel, 
L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco,180 “there is scant precedent 
for the litigation in federal district court of claims that a state agency 
has taken property in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause.”181 San Remo Hotel upheld Williamson County Regional 
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,182 which 
held that a federal takings claim is not ripe until the state fails to 
provide adequate compensation.183 Additionally, San Remo Hotel 
affirmed that the Full Faith and Credit Clause bars federal re-litiga-
tion of whether “just compensation” ought to be provided.184 
However, in the 2019 case Knick v. Township of Scott,185 a 
sharply divided Supreme Court overruled the state-litigation re-
quirement of Williamson County in a five to four decision.186 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Roberts explained that, “[c]ontrary to 
Williamson County, a property owner has a claim for a violation of 
the Takings Clause as soon as a government takes his property for 
public use without paying for it.”187 Roberts surmised that William-
son County would have a different outcome if the Court foresaw the 
“preclusion trap . . . sprung by San Remo Hotel.”188 Writing for the 
dissent, Justice Kagan defended Williamson County as unremarka-
ble and consistent with stare decisis.189 More pertinent here, Kagan 
warned that “[t]oday’s decision sends a flood of complex state-law 
issues to federal courts . . . . It betrays judicial federalism.”190 
Notwithstanding Justice Kagan’s (justifiable) judicial federal-
ism concerns, federal courts are a better forum to hear L’s and 
 
 180 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
 181 Id. at 347. 
 182 Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
 183 See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 345–48; Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195 
(“[T]he State’s action is not ‘complete’ in the sense of causing a constitutional 
injury ‘unless or until the state fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation rem-
edy for the property loss.’” (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.12 
(1984))). 
 184 See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 345–48. 
 185 Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). 
 186 See id. at 2167–68. 
 187 Id. at 2170. 
 188 Id. at 2174. 
 189 See id. at 2183 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 190 Id. at 2188–89. 
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others’ judicial takings claims. Simply put, state courts are not posi-
tioned to adequately address judicial takings claims. To illustrate, 
L’s judicial takings claim would need to be filed with or certified to 
the state supreme court because a lower state court is institutionally 
incapable of classifying the state supreme court’s judgment for X as 
a taking. Yet, it seems highly unlikely that the state supreme court 
would overrule itself by retrospectively determining that its judg-
ment for X was a taking.191 Indeed, higher state courts may also be 
reluctant to find that lower courts committed judicial takings; such 
judgments could bring negative attention and embarrassment to the 
judiciary. In sum, state supreme and appellate courts would be 
bogged down by numerous judicial takings claims, many of which 
would conceivably be dismissed out of principle. Thus, it seems in-
efficient for non-party claimants such as L to litigate judicial takings 
claims in state court.192 Accordingly, the Stop the Beach plurality 
should have expounded upon the proper forum for non-party claim-
ants to file judicial takings claims—perhaps vesting exclusive sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in federal courts. 
The Fifth Amendment only provides for compensation to be 
awarded to aggrieved parties.193 Thus, should L prevail on his judi-
cial takings claim, A would seemingly be entitled to stay on L’s 
property so long as L is compensated accordingly (or until L wins a 
separate action to oust A). Nothing in the Fifth Amendment, how-
ever, authorizes private parties to pay compensation or the state to 
compensate for land use that does not further a public purpose. Thus, 
L would appear to be without a remedy for the “judicial taking” of 
his property. Even if A leaves after judgment for L is entered, a 
 
 191 Compare Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 585–86 (D. Haw. 1977), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 753 F. 2d 1468, 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated mem. 
477 U.S. 902 (1986), with Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P. 2d 287, 294–300 (Haw. 
1982) (Hawaii State Supreme Court responds to certified questions issued by 
Ninth Circuit with self-serving answers that ultimately insulated its prior decision 
from constitutional challenge). 
 192 Of course, the federal courts (including the U.S. Supreme Court) face their 
own efficiency concerns in supplementing their dockets with judicial takings 
claims. These concerns would obviously be buttressed if the federal courts were 
granted exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over such claims. 
 193 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–37 (2005) (emphasizing 
that the Takings Clause’s focus is on providing just compensation for interference 
with property rights, not restricting the nature of such interference). 
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temporary taking would seem to have occurred in the interim.194 In 
theory, L would be entitled to compensation for A’s period of ad-
verse possession between judgment for X and judgment for L. There 
is another wrinkle: Suppose that Y had a petition for rehearing de-
nied by the state supreme court and a petition for writ of certiorari 
denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. Even if the federal court rules 
for L, there is now no apparent remedy for Y, who was not a party 
to L’s suit. Not only have Y’s procedural due process rights seem-
ingly been violated,195 res judicata would seem to bar Y from bring-
ing a subsequent claim against X.196 
To be clear, the foregoing procedural concerns are speculative. 
As judicial takings questions continue to pervade in light of Stop the 
Beach, the Supreme Court will hopefully provide more lucid guid-
ance on how and by whom judicial takings may be alleged. The 
Court’s pre-existing takings jurisprudence does offer some doctrinal 
tools for courts to narrow the scope of judicial takings in practice. 
Indeed, a court could conceivably bar L’s judicial takings claim by 
holding that adverse possession is governed by “background princi-
ples” of state property law and thus the state supreme court’s judg-
ment for X does not warrant compensation for aggrieved parties un-
der the Takings Clause. Nevertheless, the Court missed a golden 
 
 194 An adverse possessor has physically invaded the landowner’s property, 
which is a per se taking, even though only a portion of the land was invaded tem-
porarily. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 
436–37 (1982) (finding that constitutional takings protections do not depend on 
the size of the area physically occupied); First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church 
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987) (finding that 
abandonment of a taking still requires compensation for the period during which 
the regulation that constitutes the taking was in effect). 
 195 See Sotomura v. Cnty. of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473, 482–83 (D. Haw. 
1978) (holding that the Hawaii Supreme Court violated procedural due process 
when it denied petition for rehearing after introducing property ownership into 
litigation). Like most other procedural complexities posed by a judicial takings 
doctrine, procedural due process concerns were not addressed in Stop the Beach. 
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 
702, 729 n.11 (2010). 
 196 This assertion mirrors the plurality’s position in Stop the Beach. See Stop 
the Beach 560 U.S. at 727–28 (“If certiorari were denied . . . the matter would be 
res judicata.”). Justice Kennedy disagrees. Id. at 740 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[U]ntil the state court in Case A changes the law, the party will not know if his 
or her property rights will have been eliminated. So res judicata probably would 
not bar the party from litigating the takings issue in Case B.”). 
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opportunity to solidify the boundaries for judicial takings in Stop the 
Beach. 
B.  The State Courts’ Need for Flexibility 
Perhaps the most popular objection to a judicial takings doctrine 
rests upon federalism grounds.197 As the State argues in Stop the 
Beach, “[f]ederal courts should not involve themselves in and sec-
ond-guess the evolution of state common law, which can vary 
widely from state to state.”198 This quote illustrates two important 
points: (1) the common law, by its very nature, changes over time; 
and (2) property law is not uniform amongst the states. These prin-
ciples advocate against granting federal judges the power to define 
property interests—a power traditionally reserved to the states.199 
The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized “the ‘great respect’ that 
[it] owe[s] to state legislatures and state courts in discerning local 
 
 197 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 61, at 1509 (“Indeed, the most frequently 
heard objection [to a judicial takings doctrine] is that the development and speci-
fication of property law is a matter for the state courts, and that federal courts 
should not interfere with this process through assertion of the takings protec-
tions.”); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Com-
ment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 305 
(1993) (“[G]iving federal judges the last word on questions of the meanings of 
laws emanating from state authorities . . . seems to be a gross contravention of 
Our Federalism.”); John Martinez, Taking Time Seriously: The Federal Constitu-
tional Right to be Free from “Startling” State Court Overrulings, 11 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 297, 332–33 (1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court should not 
interfere with a state court’s “fundamental social choice” to adjust law to “evolv-
ing social reality”). 
 198 Brief of Respondents, Florida Department of Environmental Protection & 
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund at 58, Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010) (No. 08-
1151); see also Brief for Respondents Walton County & City of Destin at 28, Stop 
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010) 
(No. 08-1151) (“Wide variations exist among the States in their understanding of 
property rights associated with riparian lands. State courts will be more attuned to 
these differences, and have a comparative advantage relative to federal courts in 
explicating their own property systems.” (citations omitted)). 
 199 See, e.g., Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 707 (“Generally speaking, state law 
defines property interests . . . .”); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 
(1972) (“Property interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they 
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings 
that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
2021] THE DAWN OF A JUDICIAL TAKINGS DOCTRINE 827 
 
public needs.”200 Unlike the federal courts, state courts are designed 
to implement changes in the law for the welfare of their respective 
communities. It follows that state courts have an intrinsic advantage 
in interpreting its own property law, and—contrary to Scalia’s as-
sertions—do have a “peculiar need of flexibility.”201 This is partic-
ularly true for property rights incorporated into legal areas where the 
Federal Government offers little guidance, such as family and pro-
bate law.202 
Suppose, for example, that a state supreme court contravenes 
settled common law by adopting the approach endorsed by Uniform 
Probate Code (the “UPC”) §2-802, which bars divorcees from re-
ceiving the life insurance premium from their deceased former 
spouse.203 Consequently, local divorcees are abruptly deprived of a 
seemingly  “clearly established property interest”204 in their deceased 
former spouse’s life insurance—a radical yet conceivable judicial 
takings claim. Although the financial impact on affected divorcees 
could be substantial, the state supreme court’s judgment may lie in 
well-grounded policy concerns.205 Perhaps a large increase in the 
 
 200 See CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW, supra note 27, at 306 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005)); see also 
Brinkerhoff-Faris Tr. & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930) (“[T]he courts 
of a State have the supreme power to interpret and declare the written and unwrit-
ten laws of the State . . . .”). 
 201 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 727. 
 202 See generally Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: 
Understanding Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1446–49 
(1933) (discussing how states have continuously changed property laws in re-
sponse to economic and social changes). 
 203 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-802 (amended 2019) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020). 
In the absence of clear legislation, courts have been willing to follow and even 
expressly “adopt” UPC provisions. See, e.g., In re Estate of Thompson, 423 N.E. 
2d 90, 94 (Ohio 1981) (“As a result, we adopt these specific [UPC] sections as the 
law of this state.”); In re Estate of Safran, 306 N.W. 2d 27, 32 (Wis. 1981) (relying 
on provisions of the UPC and noting that several states have adopted the UPC); 
California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 515 F. Supp. 524, 532 (E.D. 
La. 1981). See generally Roger W. Andersen, The Influence of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code in Nonadopting States, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 599, 609–12 (1985) 
(discussing how UPC has been used by various courts in jurisdictions where UPC 
has not been formally adopted). 
 204 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 725. 
 205 See generally Andersen, supra note 203, at 609–12 (describing where 
judges have relied on UPC § 2-802 to address policy issues). 
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divorce rate has resulted in numerous lawsuits where divorcees are 
receiving substantial portions of their deceased former spouse’s es-
tate at the expense of their deceased former spouse’s new family. 
Accordingly, the court adapted the UPC provision in conformance 
with its policy of honoring the testator’s intent.206 If a judicial tak-
ings doctrine came to fruition, however, the court might be reluctant 
to take such action since it could be construed as a taking. Conse-
quently, the apposite UPC provision would need to negotiate the 
legislative process.207 Meanwhile, divorcees would continue to 
profit off their deceased former spouses until a law is finally passed. 
This scenario is hard to justify on efficiency or moral grounds, es-
pecially to second families of decedents. 
Like inheritance rights, littoral rights vary from state to state.208 
Consider the foreshore at issue in Stop the Beach. Florida holds its 
foreshores in trust for the public,209 but Maine and Massachusetts 
restrict public use along the foreshore of private littoral property.210 
Contrarily, public use rights extend to the vegetation line in Hawaii 
and Texas.211 Each state has its own, unique reasons for adapting 
these laws.212 Federal courts are not privy to these reasons. Indeed, 
as Scalia admits, federal courts are not free to explore the policy 
 
 206 Presumably, a testator would prefer that his new family inherit contested 
assets of his estate over his former spouse. 
 207 See Overview, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/
aboutulc/overview (last visited May 15, 2021) (“[N]o uniform law is effective 
until the state legislature adopts it.”). 
 208 Brief for Respondents Walton County & City of Destin, supra note 198, at 
16; see also United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 
702–03 (1899) (“[A]s to every stream within its dominion, a State may change 
[the] common law rule and permit the appropriation of the flowing waters for such 
purposes as it deems wise.”). 
 209 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 
702, 707 (2010) (first citing FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; and then citing Broward v. 
Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 407–409 (1909)). 
 210 See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 169 (Me. 1989); In re 
Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 567 (Mass. 1974). 
 211 See Diamond v. State, 145 P.3d 704, 712 (Haw. 2006); TEX. NAT. RES. 
CODE ANN. § 61.011(a) (West 2019). 
 212 See, e.g., Diamond, 145 P.3d at 716 (“[T]he [state] legislature’s intent 
[was] to reserve as much of the shore as possible to the public”). 
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behind established property rights.213 Yet, this is exactly what fed-
eral courts would be doing in assessing judicial takings claims. 
Although federal courts must apply the property law of different 
states in traditional takings contexts,214 the focus is on whether a 
regulation’s effect upon property rights mandates compensation, not 
the extent to which the regulation alters the law.215 In other words, 
judicial takings actually require a judge to assess the precedent for 
the “state action” (or the judge’s decision), rather than simply its end 
result. Of course, the merit of a judge’s reasoning may not be meas-
ured under the firm, universal standards that govern traditional tak-
ings (e.g., physical invasion is a per se taking, parcel is viewed as a 
whole, etc.). Therefore, in applying a judicial takings doctrine, fed-
eral courts would have little guidance in embarking on ad hoc in-
quiries into diverse and complex areas of state law. 
C. “Background Principles” of State Law 
Proponents of a judicial takings doctrine counter federalism ar-
guments by denoting state court abuse of the “background princi-
ples” enunciated in Lucas.216 By examining the extent of a claim-
ant’s title instead of the regulation’s impact on property rights, 
 
 213 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 732. 
 214 As an example, Scalia identifies the “background principles” of state prop-
erty law federal courts must apply in determining whether a parcel has been de-
prived of all economically beneficial use. See id. at 726–27 (citing Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)). 
 215 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–37 (2005) (“[T]he 
Takings Clause ‘does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places 
a condition on the exercise of that power.’ In other words, it ‘is designed not to 
limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure 
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a tak-
ing.’” (quoting First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of 
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1982))). 
 216 See, e.g., David W. Saratt, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 
VA. L. REV. 1487, 1490–95 (2004) (“[T]he Lucas rule’s background-principles 
exception invites state courts to reshuffle property rights in ways that state legis-
latures cannot, potentially allowing the state to avoid paying compensation for 
takings of property.”); Walston, supra note 33, at 423–25 (explaining that Lucas’s 
“background principles” present issues in the context of judicial takings); David 
J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial 
Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1442–46 (1996) (discussing how state courts 
have used custom to circumvent takings protections). 
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courts avoid the just compensation question.217 In such a circum-
stance, courts typically act in accordance with the legislature’s di-
rective; indeed, courts often rely on historical policy to uphold a 
statute or other official declaration.218 However, the legislature may 
be unable or unwilling to pass a regulation directly and look to judi-
cial enforcement as an alternative. For example, the legislature may 
authorize private conservation groups to bring nuisance suits against 
private property owners on behalf of the public welfare.219 The ju-
diciary can then classify such nuisances as background principles of 
state property law to justify the termination of the source property 
interests. 
Flexible legal doctrines such as custom and the public trust doc-
trine permit state courts to advance background principles of their 
jurisdictions’ property law. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement 
Ass’n,220 a New Jersey Supreme Court case, provides a particularly 
vivid example of the power of the public trust doctrine. Matthews 
centered around the public’s access to the area between the MHWL 
and the vegetation line of private littoral property.221 New Jersey 
precedent appeared to indicate that the public’s interest in this area 
was contingent on it being municipally owned.222 Nevertheless, the 
court—noting that the “dynamic” public trust doctrine is not “fixed 
or static” and may “be molded [or] extended”—held that even pri-
vate dry sand area must remain accessible and usable by the public 
 
 217 See Saratt, supra note 216, at 1491–92. 
 218 See supra Part I.C.; supra note 79 (discussing Oregon Supreme Court’s use 
of custom); see also supra page 20 (quoting the Florida Supreme Court’s refer-
ence to the public trust in Stop the Beach); Crane Neck Ass’n, Inc. v. N.Y.C./Long 
Island Cnty. Servs. Grp., 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1339 (N.Y. 1984) (finding that “long-
standing public policy” favoring community residences for the mentally handi-
capped prevents enforcement of a restrictive covenant against such a residence); 
Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cnty. Plan. Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1268 
(Haw. 1995) (denying shoreline development permit because private develop-
ment rights are subject to preexisting Native Hawaiian gathering rights). 
 219 See, e.g., Saratt, supra note 216, at 1492 (providing a hypothetical twist of 
the facts in Lucas); Thompson, supra note 61, at 1507 (discussing laws passed in 
Oregon and Texas encouraging public lawsuits for greater beach access). 
 220 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
 221 See id. at 358, 358 n.1. 
 222 See id. at 363. 
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to ensure reasonable enjoyment of the beach.223 In so holding, the 
Court arguably deprived New Jersey’s private littoral owners of the 
biggest stick in their bundle of property rights: the right to ex-
clude.224 
The outcome of Matthews certainly might have been different if 
the New Jersey Supreme Court felt threatened by the prospect of 
committing a judicial taking. Consequently, if an established judi-
cial takings doctrine were in place, the New Jersey public might not 
be permitted to enjoy the beaches (adjoining private land) that it 
does today. Although private littoral property rights would be pre-
served in this instance, legitimate utilitarian questions would arise. 
Public beaches serve as a socializing institution with scale returns.225 
Thus, private owners hinder a community ’s development by keeping 
the public from civilizing and socializing at perceived, customary 
recreational sites (e.g., beaches).226 Whereas in Matthews, the public 
demand for access to a recreational site increases,227 the state has a 
duty to explore accommodating this demand. The Matthews court 
met this duty by effectively balancing the public and private prop-
erty interests at stake: Public use of privately-owned dry sand is re-
stricted to that which is reasonably necessary and remains subject 
to the littoral rights of private owners.228 A judicial takings doctrine 
 
 223 Id. at 365 (quoting Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-
Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972)). 
 224 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describ-
ing the right to exclude others as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
rights that are commonly characterized as property”); Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987). 
 225 Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property: Judicial 
Theories and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REV. 627, 644 (1989) (citing Carol 
Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 779 (1986)). 
 226 See Rose, supra note 225, at 779–80. 
 227 Matthews, 471 at 364–65. 
 228 Id. The Matthews Court clarified that the public’s right to access/use de-
pends on the beach at issue. See id. Pertinent circumstances include the proximity 
of the contested area to the foreshore, any publicly owned beach in the area, the 
nature and extent of public demand, and the upland usage of the private owner. 
Id. The Court also suggested that the public’s right to reasonable access is 
grounded in the law of nuisance. See id. at 364 (“Judge Best would have held on 
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would frustrate such compromises between public and private inter-
ests, espousing private property rights at the public’s expense. 
Background principles give courts an easy out, but they also pro-
mote the public welfare. The Supreme Court ought to remind state 
courts that Lucas does not give them a green light to reinvent prop-
erty law. A judicial takings doctrine, however, is not the way to go 
about this. The plurality ’s judicial takings doctrine threatens courts’ 
ability to advance “customary [public property] rights[,] [which] 
promote strong economic and social utilities.”229 Public property in-
terests must conform to private property interests, but they should 
not yield to them outright. 
D.  Prospective Views of Takings Scholars on a Judicial 
Takings Doctrine 
With such little authority (and commentary) available on judicial 
takings, it is helpful to speculate how some leading takings scholars 
would receive the doctrine announced in Stop the Beach. One such 
scholar is Joseph Sax. Sax proposes a rule where a taking only oc-
curs when the government acts as an “enterprise” or acquires re-
sources for its own accord.230 When the government acts as an “ar-
biter” or mediates disputes between different citizens or groups in 
society, no compensation should be required.231 Although Sax rea-
sons that the Takings Clause does not apply to the courts anyway,232 
it is hard to discern a clearer instance of the government acting as an 
arbiter than when it acts through the judiciary. A judge does not act 
with the objective of gaining anything; rather, a judge balances the 
interests between two sides.233 Even when the judiciary radically 
 
principles of public policy ‘that the interruption of free access to the sea is a public 
nuisance.’” (quoting Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & Ald. 268, 287 (K.B. 1821))). 
For an interesting discussion on how nuisance law protects public beach access, 
see Finnell, supra note 225, at 646–50. 
 229 Bederman, supra note 216, at 1454. 
 230 See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63 
(1964). 
 231 See id. 
 232 See id. at 51 (“[W]hatever it is that the compensation clause is preventing, 
it is something other than the destruction of established economic values. Changes 
in the common law are frequently made . . . yet we invariably deny compensation 
on the ground that there was no property interest . . . .”). 
 233 See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
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alters property law to rule for the state, it does not “create[] and de-
fine[] the [resources] need[ed]”234 for the state objective—the legis-
lature does. 
Consider Stop the Beach. The local governments of the City of 
Destin and Walton County decided they needed to restore their 
beaches and acted.235 The local governments—not the Court—de-
termined the commodity needed (beach), where it was needed 
(along the shore of the City and the County), what amounts it needed 
(the total amount of sand deposited from the ebb shoal borrow in 
Okaloosa County), and what times it needed it (after Hurricane Opal 
hit in 1995).236 As in any other takings case, the Court simply de-
cided whether the State could lawfully carry out this initiative with-
out providing compensation.237 
Of course, by serving as the arbiter in takings disputes, society 
relies on the judiciary to honor its proprietary expectations. When 
people disapprove of the process by which the government inter-
feres with these expectations, demoralization costs are incurred.238 
Famous takings critic Frank Michelman postulates that a taking oc-
curs when these demoralizations costs exceed the settlement costs 
of paying compensation.239 Reasoning that U.S. takings jurispru-
dence is inherently flawed,240 Michelman advocates for a self-
 
 234 See Sax, supra note 230, at 64. 
 235 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 
U.S. 702, 711 (2010). As a side note, it does not appear that the local governments 
acted as an “enterprise” in Stop the Beach. See supra note 230 and accompanying 
text. The Project was ordered as a remedial measure in the wake of Hurricane 
Opal. See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 711. The State did not actually acquire land 
from the property owners but used sand dredged elsewhere to restore its own sub-
merged land for the public’s benefit. Id. One can argue that the local governments 
acted as an “arbiter” between the property owners and the public. See supra note 
231 and accompanying text. 
 236 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 711; Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t 
of Env’t Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 50–51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d sub nom. 
Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 
2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. 702. 
 237 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 733. 
 238 See Thompson, supra note 61, at 1480–81. 
 239 Michelman, supra note 54, at 1214–15. 
 240 See id. at 1250 (“It is rather to suggest the abandonment of any idea that 
courts can or will decide each compensability case directly in accordance with the 
precept of fairness.”). 
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regulatory system whereby the aforementioned takings formula is 
“built directly into the system of political decision making” (as op-
posed to a judicial doctrine).241 Thus, Michelman would appear to 
reject a judicial takings doctrine by default. 
Moreover, Michelman probably would not deem the demorali-
zation costs arising from judicial takings worthy of compensation 
anyway. After all, Americans trust the judicial process.242 The court-
house is a beacon of fairness in a community; judges are the nation ’s 
greatest advocates of justice.243 The judiciary is sequestered from 
many of the political pressures facing other branches of government, 
particularly ex parte lobbying.244 By nature, a trial is a public oper-
ation245 restricted by the dispute at-hand.246 The outcome of the trial, 
of course, is subject to an appellate process that should in theory 
amend any fallacious decisions.247 It follows that people do not tend 
to question the process by which judges arrive at their conclusions—
at least from the outside looking in. Consequently, judicial decisions 
do not generally give rise to significant demoralization costs. 
Again, consider Stop the Beach. Presumably, most littoral prop-
erty owners in Florida trust the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment. 
 
 241 Id. at 1245 (emphasis added). 
 242 See Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in Judicial Branch Up, Executive Branch 
Down, GALLUP (Sept. 20, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/219674/trust-judi-
cial-branch-executive-branch-down.aspx (“Americans place the greatest faith in 
the judicial branch and the least in the legislative branch.”); Thomas J. Leeper, 
Do you Trust the Supreme Court?, PSYCH. TODAY (Mar. 30, 2012), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/polarized/201203/do-you-trust-the-
supreme-court (discussing why Americans trust the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 243 See William K. Weisenberg, Why Our Judges and Courts Are Important, 
ABA J. (Feb. 1, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/arti-
cle/why_our_judges_and_courts_are_important. 
 244 See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
 245 See Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884) (“It is desirable that the 
trial of causes should take place under the public eye . . . because it is of the high-
est moment that those who administer justice should always act under the sense 
of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself 
with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.”). 
 246 See How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, Civil and Criminal Cases, ABA 
(Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/re-
sources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/cases/. 
 247 See How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, Appeals, ABA (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_re-
lated_education_network/how_courts_work/appeals/. 
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Most likely, the majority of these property owners did not go to law 
school and feel unqualified to question the Court’s logic. Perhaps 
some property owners thought they had an absolute right to have 
their property abut the water before the decision, but now, they just 
feel misinformed. To be clear, the pertinent question is not whether 
the property owners are disappointed with the judgment itself. Ra-
ther, it is whether the property owners are satisfied with the process 
by which the judgment was reached. Surely, any remaining doubts 
the property owners had regarding the fairness of the legal process 
were assuaged when the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
unanimously affirmed the judgment. 
This is not to say that the public’s trust in the judiciary is abso-
lute. To the contrary, the backlash to the U.S. Supreme Court ’s con-
troversial decision in Kelo v. City of New London248 illustrates the 
disdain people may have for courts that facilitate radical exercises 
of eminent domain.249 Indeed, the U.S. House of Representatives 
actually passed a resolution formally condemning the decision in 
Kelo.250 One outraged citizen even went so far as to formally pro-
pose that a hotel be built on the property of Justice Souter, who 
joined in the majority opinion.251 
 
 248 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). In Kelo, the Court ap-
proved a condemnation of private residential property so that the land could be 
transferred to Pfizer pharmaceutical corporation to further economic development 
in the area. See id. at 473–475, 489. 
 249 See, e.g., Carol L. Zeiner, Establishing a Leasehold Through Eminent Do-
main: A Slippery Slope Made More Treacherous by Kelo, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 
503, 509, 544–545 (2007); Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City 
of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 495–98 (2006); Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, Note, In 
the Name of Economic Development: Reviving “Public Use” as a Limitation on 
the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London, 54 
DRAKE L. REV. 171, 227–28 (2005); Peter M. Agnetti, Comment, Are You Still 
Master of Your Domain? Abuses of Economic Development Takings, and Michi-
gan’s Return to “Public Use” in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 1259, 1266 (2005). 
 250 See H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted); see also Alex Hornaday, 
Note, Imminently Eminent: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Takings Since Kelo v. 
City of New London, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1619, 1632–38 (discussing various 
state legislatures’ reactions to Kelo). 
 251 Opinion, They Paved Paradise, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2005, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112008935423373523. The outraged citizen 
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Kelo illustrates how an unpopular decision can spark immediate 
public outcry, but less publicized cases also generate more subtle 
demoralization costs over time. As one commentator points out, 
“broad” shifts in property law may portray the judiciary as a system-
atic threat to property rights.252 Take a relatively recent case, 
Fancher v. Fagella,253 where the Virginia Supreme Court over-
turned seventy years of precedent in holding that property owners 
may sue their neighbors to cut down invasive trees/roots under nui-
sance theory.254 The decision was grounded in policy recognizing 
Virginia’s transformation from a more rural state to a suburban 
one.255 While this decision may have appeased suburban owners, it 
probably did not sit well with many rural owners. Such rural owners 
now must now worry whether their seemingly innocuous flora sus-
cept them to legal liability. This psychological trepidation may lin-
ger for years and ultimately manifest as tangible losses (e.g., survey-
ing land, hiring counsel, and even lowering home prices). Perhaps 
most significantly, rural owners may fear that Fancher represents a 
systematic judicial trend towards facilitating suburban development 
at the expense of their own private property rights. 
The motivations of the judiciary are also subject to skepticism at 
a much more troubling level. It is not uncommon for a judge to have 
a personal stake in the outcome of a case to which they are ap-
pointed;256 judicial collusion with interested parties—government 
or otherwise—is a plausible concern. Internal policing mechanisms, 
however, prevent these concerns from translating into heavy 
 
claimed that the New Hampshire city where Justice Souter resides “will certainly 
gain greater tax revenue and economic benefits with a hotel on [the land] than 
allowing Mr. Souter to own the land.” Id. The proposed project—the “Lost Lib-
erty Hotel”—was eventually defeated at the polls. Sara Morrison, The Supreme 
Court Decision that Threatened Justices’ Own Homes, BOSTON.COM (June 29, 
2015), https://www.boston.com/news/national-news/2015/06/29/the-supreme-
court-decision-that-threatened-justices-own-homes. 
 252 Thompson, supra note 61, at 1479–1480. 
 253 Fancher v. Fagella, 650 S.E.2d 519 (Va. 2007). 
 254 See id. at 520, 523. 
 255 See id. at 521. 
 256 See, e.g., Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson & Madison Alder, It’s Barret’s 
Call Which Cases She’d Sit out: Recusal Explained (2), BLOOMBERG (Oct. 13, 
2020, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/its-barretts-call-
which-cases-shed-sit-out-recusal-explained (discussing the process for recusal in 
U.S. Supreme Court Cases). 
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demoralization costs.257 Before a judge is elected or appointed, his 
character and background is closely scrutinized.258 Moreover, 
judges regularly undergo meritocratic examinations and are only 
promoted if their decisions conform to standard practice.259 A judge 
whose impartiality may be compromised is bound by the Due Pro-
cess Clause to recuse himself.260 Indeed, if a judge is caught self-
dealing, he faces impeachment or even ex-post criminal prosecu-
tion.261 For an example of these internal mechanisms at work, one 
need look no further than Stop the Beach, where Justice Stevens 
recused himself because he owned oceanfront property in Florida.262 
Venerable actions like this keep the demoralization costs arising 
from judicial decision-making relatively low—certainly below 
whatever the settlement costs of incorporating a judicial takings 
doctrine (e.g., assessing, negotiating and issuing appropriate com-
pensation) would be. 
Unlike Michelman, fellow takings scholar Bruce Ackerman pro-
poses a rule that focuses on how the result of the judgment is per-
ceived. Ackerman offers a simple solution to the takings conun-
drum: Would an ordinary layman consider it a “bad joke” to say that 
his property is left with something of value in light of government 
regulation?263 Ackerman does not clarify the threshold for a “bad 
joke,” but common sense dictates that the remaining property value 
ought to be negligible. A judicial taking could conceivably result in 
such extensive property loss, but Stop the Beach and the other 
 
 257 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (“A 
judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office 
fairly and impartially.”). 
 258 See DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43762, THE 
APPOINTMENT PROCESS FOR U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT NOMINATIONS: 
AN OVERVIEW 13–14 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43762.pdf. 
 259 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 186 
(1977). 
 260 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009); Concrete 
Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 
602, 617 (1993) (“[D]ue process requires a neutral and detached judge in the first 
instance.” (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1972))). 
 261 See Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or 
Due Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 329 (2012) (discussing judicial self-
dealing and providing accordant background sources). 
 262 See supra note 137. 
 263 ACKERMAN, supra note 259, at 142. 
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preeminent judicial takings cases do not proffer such a circum-
stance. 
The affected littoral property owners in Stop the Beach, Hughes, 
Stevens, and Matthews all retained their homes and right to enjoy 
the adjacent beach.264 Although property values might have de-
creased from increased public presence along the beach, the proper-
ties were certainly not relegated to a “bad joke.” Indeed, in the case 
of Stop the Beach, the completed Project could actually make the 
community a more attractive place to live.265 Therefore, littoral 
property values in Destin and Walton County may actually increase 
over time.266 Pruneyard offers a different context to measure the di-
chotomy between judicial takings and Ackerman’s test. Although 
the California shopping mall owners lost the right to exclude peti-
tioners, the value of their shopping malls was not substantially im-
paired at all.267 Considering his test’s poor bearing with these cases, 
and his support for a judiciary that is innovative and policy-
driven,268 Ackerman—like Sax and Michelman—would likely dis-
pute the utility of the plurality ’s judicial takings doctrine. 
E. In Favor of Due Process 
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, the judicial takings doc-
trine offered by the Stop the Beach plurality presents many practical 
and policy concerns. Fortunately, the doctrine did not receive a ma-
jority endorsement.269 Moreover, Scalia did not explain the intrica-
cies and scope of the doctrine in any depth.270 It follows that the 
 
 264 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 
U.S. 730, 732–33 (2010); Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 293–94 (1967); 
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 460 (Ore. 1993); Matthews v. 
Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 369 (N.J. 1984). 
 265 In addition to increased recreational and aesthetic value, beach restoration 
helps protect littoral property from beach erosion. Why Beach Restoration, FLA. 
DEP’T ENV’T PROT. (Sept. 18, 2020, 2:24 PM), https://flori-
dadep.gov/rcp/beaches-funding-program/content/why-beach-restoration. 
 266 See Louis Jacobson, Beach Ruling Cheers Locals, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jun. 
18, 2010), https://www.tampabay.com/archive/2010/06/18/beach-ruling-cheers-
locals/. 
 267 Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980). 
 268 See ACKERMAN, supra note 259, at 38, 188–89. 
 269 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 707. 
 270 See supra Part II.C.1. 
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Court should face continued pressure to address the judicial takings 
conundrum. Accordingly, the Court should have plenty of opportu-
nities to revisit Stop the Beach and explore alternatives to a judicial 
takings doctrine—the most sensible of which is the Due Process 
Clause. 
As Justice Kennedy attests in his concurrence, invalidating prop-
erty regulation under the Due Process Clause is not a foreign con-
cept.271 Scalia, however, expresses skepticism over how the Due 
Process Clause can be construed to limit the power of courts to alter 
or eliminate established property rights.272 Contending that Ken-
nedy’s proposal “places no constraints whatever upon this Court,” 
Scalia implies that the Due Process Clause’s application to judicial 
takings would essentially be illusory.273 Scalia’s utter disdain for due 
process in the judicial takings context is puzzling, as determining 
whether a judicial decision abruptly eliminated property rights re-
quires similar deductions to deciding whether a judicial decision is 
arbitrary or irrational. Both tests require a court to consider what 
constitutes a clearly established property right in order to gauge pro-
prietary expectations.274 Courts then must view judicial interference 
with these expectations in the context of that state’s property law. 
Although federalism concerns are raised whenever federal 
courts make judgments affecting state property law, the Due Process 
Clause maintains the status quo. The Due Process Clause—which is 
inherently broader than the Takings Clause—requires all branches 
of government to follow basic standards of reasonableness and fair-
ness.275 It follows that courts already understand that due process 
 
 271 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 735 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court 
has long recognized that property regulations can be invalidated under the Due 
Process Clause.”). In addition to the examples Kennedy cites here, see supra notes 
21–23; see also Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 (1985) 
(finding that continued enrollment in college is a protected property interest); Har-
rah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 199 (1979) (employment contract 
is a protected property interest). But cf. Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Ill., 852 F.2d 
951, 957 (7th Cir. 1988) (refusing to apply substantive due process to expropria-
tion); Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287, 1293–94 (5th Cir. 1986) (refusing to 
apply substantive due process to a biased tribunal). 
 272 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 719 (plurality opinion). 
 273 Id. at 724 (“[E]ven a firm commitment to apply [substantive due process] 
would be a firm commitment to nothing in particular.”). 
 274 See id. at 715; id. at 737 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 275 Walston, supra note 33, at 435. 
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prevents them from abandoning settled principles.276 Because it is 
universally understood that state courts interpret the law to adapt to 
social norms and realities,277 state courts only abandon settled prin-
ciples when they make truly irrational or arbitrary decisions.278 This 
is a much higher standard than the plurality’s judicial takings doc-
trine.279 Take the example above where a court “adapts” the UPC 
provision barring divorcee non-probate inheritance.280 The court 
may have terminated a property right, but it also made a prudent 
decision that surely is not arbitrary or irrational. Consequently, due 
process challenges to the decision would be fruitless. The take-away 
here is that much fewer judicial takings claims would have merit 
under the Due Process Clause than the Takings Clause. Thus, under 
due process analysis, federal courts would not be asked to interpret 
and define state property law nearly as often. 
In addition to filtering frivolous claims, the Due Process Clause 
bypasses the procedural issues associated with takings claims.281 As 
discussed above, forum availability for takings claims has histori-
cally vexed the U.S. Supreme Court.282 Even following Knick, the 
story of where takings claims are filed and how they are resolved 
under this new jurisprudence is yet to be written. A judicial takings 
doctrine would “invite a host of federal takings claims without the 
mature consideration of potential procedural or substantive legal 
principles.”283 Due process claims—which may generally be 
brought in state or federal court and offer the sole remedy of 
 
 276 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 738 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 277 See Martinez, supra note 197, at 332–33; Walston, supra note 33, at 429 
(“The process of trial and error, of change of decision in order to conform with 
changing ideas and conditions, is traditional with courts administering the com-
mon law.”); Joseph L. Sax, Some Unorthodox Thoughts About Rising Sea Levels, 
Beach Erosion, and Property Rights, 11 VT. J. ENV’T L. 641, 645 (2010) (“Tradi-
tional common law rules do not fit contemporary circumstances.”). 
 278 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 736–37 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 279 See id. at 715 (majority opinion). 
 280 See supra notes 203–207 and accompanying text. 
 281 See supra Part III.A.; see also Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory In-
tent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings 
Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 738 (2002) (commenting on indeterminate nature of 
regulatory takings); Barros, supra note 137, at 945 (discussing procedural obsta-
cles to takings claims). 
 282 See supra Part I.C. 
 283 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 743 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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injunctive relief—offer a simpler, more operative avenue to redress 
that requires no doctrinal reconstruction.284 
As discussed above, the obstacles to facilitating a judicial tak-
ings doctrine are not limited to getting such claims heard; resolving 
them is equally problematic.285 Unlike other branches of govern-
ment, courts do not budget expenses between different public 
goals.286 The judiciary’s role is strictly adjudicatory; courts are not 
positioned to evaluate the utility of transferring public funds (com-
pensating) to achieve a taking.287 Accordingly, reviewing courts, 
particularly at the federal level, may be reluctant to expend public 
funds to compensate for judicial takings. 
Scalia rebuts this concern by maintaining that the legislature 
would still ultimately decide whether to carry out a judicial taking 
or restore the affected property rights.288 Although appealing at first 
glance, this approach weakens the institutional barrier between the 
judiciary and legislature. The judiciary could essentially force the 
legislature to act on an issue the legislature has either neglected or 
not considered—not to mention deal with the scrutiny and pressure 
that come with it.289 Standoffs between discordant legislative offi-
cials are conceivable. If the legislature could not procure the requi-
site votes to statutorily override the judicial taking, it might feel 
compelled to pay compensation to avert damaging the government’s 
credibility.290 As one commentator explains, “legislative unwilling-
ness to pay compensation in the face of a court order would seem a 
willful ducking of a constitutional imperative.”291 Regardless of 
how the legislature responds, the ruling court has stepped outside its 
 
 284 See Krotoszynski, supra note 281, at 738 (“Lower court judges and gov-
ernment officials have a very good idea of what substantive due process requires 
and can identify and apply the appropriate tests with relative ease.”). 
 285 See supra Part III.A. 
 286 See Walston, supra note 33, at 436. 
 287 See id. 
 288 See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 723–24 (majority opinion). 
 289 See Thompson, supra note 61, at 1485 (discussing how legislature is more 
susceptible to external political pressures than judiciary). 
 290 Id. at 1517–19. Contrast the affirmative act of paying compensation (and 
its accordant externalities) with inaction, the typical legislative course when a req-
uisite number of votes cannot be obtained. 
 291 Id. at 1518. 
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adjudicatory role into an administrative one, compromising tradi-
tional separation-of-powers principles. 
Of course, like any other legislative process, reviewing a judicial 
taking would take time. Meanwhile, aggrieved property owners 
would have to wait an indeterminate length of time before receiving 
compensation or having their property rights restored. Externalities 
from the delayed review of other legislation would also be incurred. 
Alternatively, under the Due Process Clause, aggrieved property 
owners enjoy immediate restitution in the form of injunctive re-
lief.292 The judiciary would remain within its adjudicatory role and 
the legislature need not get involved. Contrary to Scalia’s assertions, 
the Due Process Clause would not simply “do the work” of the Tak-
ings Clause in this scenario293—it would do it much better. 
IV.  COMMENT ON PEÑALVER & STRAHILEVITZ’S ARTICLE: 
“JUDICIAL TAKINGS OR DUE PROCESS?” 
A.  The Four-Factors Approach 
Perhaps a middle ground exists that would satiate both critics 
and proponents of a judicial takings doctrine. Legal scholars Edu-
ardo M. Peñalver and Lior Strahilevitz—Professors at Cornell Law 
School and University of Chicago Law School, respectively294—of-
fer an intriguing, conciliatory proposal.295 Peñalver purports that 
four factors warrant application of the Takings Clause to a judicial 
taking: (1) intent to appropriate private property for public use (“ap-
propriatory intent”); (2) repeat player litigants (typically the govern-
ment); (3) state retention of property for public use; and (4) coordi-
nation between the judiciary and another body of government.296 Al-
ternatively, the absence of factors (1) through (3), in conjunction 
with self-dealing by the judiciary (as opposed to coordination with 
 
 292 See Patrick T. Gillen, Preliminary Injunctive Relief Against Governmental 
Defendants: Trustworthy Shield or Sword of Damocles?, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 269, 
275–76 (2016). 
 293 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 720. 
 294 For the sake of brevity, both authors are referred to collectively as “Peñal-
ver”. 
 295 See generally Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 305. 
 296 Id. at 354–55, 355 tbl.1. 
2021] THE DAWN OF A JUDICIAL TAKINGS DOCTRINE 843 
 
another branch of government), favors due process.297 
“[E]xpect[ing] the factors to correlate strongly in the majority of 
cases, with the intent element providing much of the connective tis-
sue,” Peñalver does not clarify whether appropriatory intent—or any 
other factor—is dispositive.298 This Part establishes that the poten-
tial for divergent factors is much higher than Peñalver suggests and 
raises concerns about the efficacy of the “four-factors” approach in 
practice. 
At first glance, “[judicial] intent to appropriate property for pub-
lic use”299 seems like a fair benchmark for use of the Takings Clause. 
After all, the Takings Clause entitles the state to take private prop-
erty for public use, so long as it provides just compensation.300 The 
problem is that it is not always clear when a judge intends to take 
private property for public use. For example, suppose a judge de-
mands the surrender of property to satisfy an outstanding tax obli-
gation. Arguably, the judge has “taken” the property for public 
use—or at the very least, a public purpose (to retrieve tax dollars 
that ultimately benefit the public). The targeted property owner’s 
loss is by itself a means to achieving a public end, which is Peñal-
ver’s chief criterion for gauging appropriatory intent.301 It seems 
odd, however, to categorize this type of seizure as a taking. The gov-
ernment has no real interest in the functional value of the property, 
just its monetary value. Indeed, the third factor of Peñalver’s test—
state retention of the property for public use—is absent, as the gov-
ernment would presumably just auction off the property to another 
private owner. 
The famous U.S. Supreme Court takings case United States v. 
Causby302 offers another useful hypothetical. In Causby, the Court 
held that the invasion of a farm owner ’s airspace via low-flying mil-
itary aircraft could be a taking.303 Although Causby did not arise in 
the judicial takings context, it illustrates the difficulty in gauging 
when land has been intentionally appropriated. Peñalver does wisely 
 
 297 Id. at 355 tbl.1. 
 298 Id. (discussing four factors warranting judicial takings). 
 299 Id. at 355. 
 300 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 301 See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 326. 
 302 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
 303 Id. at 266–67. 
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equate the intent to appropriate with the more flexible intent to reg-
ulate.304 In Causby, however, the United States assumed that the Air 
Commerce Act granted its military aircraft clearance to traverse the 
skies at will; it did not target or otherwise intend to regulate the farm 
owner’s land at all.305 It follows that an appropriatory intent bench-
mark is not foolproof and would place judicial takings at odds with 
traditional takings. To be clear, the intention here is not to nitpick at 
Peñalver’s logic—which really is quite sound—but rather to shed 
light on the incongruities presented by a categorical approach to ju-
dicial takings. Although limiting the cases that warrant compensa-
tion would allay the net impact of the Stop the Beach plurality’s ju-
dicial takings doctrine, it would equally muddle the nation’s notori-
ously perplexing takings jurisprudence.306 
The assumption behind Peñalver’s appropriatory intent standard 
is that the state will almost always be a party to the action.307 It is 
easy to hypothesize, however, disputes between private parties 
where a judge could act with appropriatory intent. Matthews308 and 
its offspring Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club309 
illustrate the most prevalent setting for such private disputes: 
beaches. Additionally, private altercations over traditional public fo-
rums may elicit rulings fueled by appropriatory intent. In 
 
 304 Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 321 n.66 (citing Krotoszynski, 
supra note 281, at 718). 
 305 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 260 (relying on the Air Commerce Act to operate 
the overhead aircraft, not eminent domain or any sort of other proceedings di-
rected at the parcel in question). 
 306 See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Tak-
ings: A Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 1026 (2000) (equating regulatory tak-
ings law to a “murky sea”); D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Po-
tential Long-Term Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and 
Substantive Due Process, 69 ALB. L. REV. 343, 345 (2005) (denoting takings ju-
risprudence as “a mass of contradictory caselaw”); Amy C. Brandt, Comment, 
Sedona’s Sustainable Growth Ordinance: Testing the Parameters of Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1297, 1313 (1996) (“Unfortunately, case law on 
the Takings Clause is both voluminous and confusing.”); see also Peñalver & 
Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 321 n.64 (listing cases). 
 307 Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 354. 
 308 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
 309 Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 851 A.2d 19, 22 (N.J. 
2006) (holding that a Beach Club cannot charge public for intermittent recrea-
tional beach use). 
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Pruneyard, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly endorsed 
public petitioning in a shopping mall despite no state advocate.310 
Other courts hearing private disputes have sanctioned public distri-
bution of controversial political literature at a private university311 
and picketing along the sidewalk outside of a privately-owned ca-
sino.312 Once again, in these scenarios, a lack of correlation among 
the four factors is apparent: appropriatory intent is present; the pres-
ence of a “repeat-player” litigant (the state) is not; state retention of 
the property is debatable (the state is not taking ownership of private 
property but is nevertheless affirming the public ’s indefinite right to 
access and utilize it); and coordination is presumably absent without 
more evidence.313 
Peñalver’s distinction between private and public litigants 
touches on a more fundamental problem with his approach: The line 
between traditional regulatory takings and disputes allocating prop-
erty among private parties has been blurred considerably by cases 
like Berman,314 Midkiff,315 and Kelo316 that stand for the proposition 
that a private-to-private transfer of land can still further a public pur-
pose (and thus constitute a valid exercise of eminent domain). While 
these cases stretch the ambit of the Takings Clause to reach a 
broader set of public ends (specifically, economic redevelopment), 
they discount reliance on appropriatory intent. After all, private-to-
private transfers of land necessarily reflect state intent to do just 
that—not appropriate land for public use.317 Peñalver does advocate 
 
 310 See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 311 See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 633 (N.J. 1980) (finding that state con-
stitution permits distribution of political literature at Princeton University). 
 312 See Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. Loc. Joint Exec. Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 
948 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a privately-owned sidewalk outside Casino con-
stitutes public forum subject to First Amendment protections). 
 313 The difficulties in establishing the coordination factor are discussed in infa 
notes 322–28 and accompanying text. 
 314 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35–36 (1954). 
 315 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). 
 316 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005). 
 317 Ironically, Peñalver actually cites Kelo to support the use of intent to clas-
sify takings. See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 321–22. He interprets 
the dicta in Kelo casting eminent domain where it serves as a pretext for private 
gain to seemingly mandate an ad hoc assessment of a condemning body’s “actual 
intent.” Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 322 (“In Kelo, however, the 
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for an extremely broad interpretation of “appropriatory intent” that 
borders on illusory.318 But it is hard to envision how, under any ra-
tional standard, a judge intends to  “appropriate” or “regulate” land 
for the public when the court transfers the land to a new private 
owner. Such transfers do not facilitate public access, enjoyment, or 
even expression;319 they offer only intangible benefits to the public 
through future economic redevelopment, at least in the traditional 
private-to-private takings context.320 
Despite the major questions raised by an appropriatory intent 
standard, Peñalver does offer some constructive support for its 
use.321 Not so for the fourth factor of his approach: coordination be-
tween the judiciary and another branch.322 In short, this factor ap-
pears to be an outlier from the other three factors, which are all typ-
ical—although certainly not dispositive—hallmarks of takings.323 
Contrarily, calculated coordination to facilitate a judicial taking is 
 
Court seemed to go farther [than relying on the explicit language of the Takings 
Clause], emphasizing that for an explicit use of eminent domain power the con-
demnor’s actual intent must be to foster a ‘public use’ . . . .”). 
 318 Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 322. Peñalver proposes than an 
intent to regulate or appropriate be inferred where a “regulation deprives an owner 
of a property right that he previously possessed in order to accomplish some valid 
public end.” Id. at 321 n.66. Significantly, nothing in this language distinguishes 
traditional takings from disputes between private litigants where a judge is indif-
ferent to the winners and losers of the case (e.g., the prototypical due process cases 
discussed in Peñalver’s article. See id. at 355). In fact, this standard is very similar 
to the all-encompassing judicial takings doctrine proffered in Stop the Beach. See 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 
715 (2010). 
 319 Indeed, in Berman, public access to the property was presumably hin-
dered—if not abrogated completely—when the plaintiff’s department store was 
condemned. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 31, 33–36. 
 320 See id. at 34–36. 
 321 See generally Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 319–335 (explor-
ing, inter alia, questions of intent, coordination, retroactivity, and regulatory tak-
ings). 
 322 See id. at 328–31 (discussing coordination). 
 323 See id. at 328 (“[T]he Takings Clause addresses situations in which the 
government intentionally diminishes a private owner’s property rights to achieve 
a legitimate public end, permitting the government to exercise this power but po-
tentially requiring the payment of just compensation.”); id at 329 (noting that co-
ordination is a factor that “acts as a proxy for intent”). 
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only present in rare circumstances.324 That’s not to say that coordi-
nation isn’t plausible in most cases—another governmental branch 
will almost always have some sort of interest in a potential change 
in property law.325 It just isn’t clear why coordination should give 
rise to takings liability over due process. 
A coordinated judicial change in property law still navigates the 
proper legislative channels—so the argument to treat it like an ordi-
nary legislative taking falls short. Moreover, the focus should be on 
deterring such coordination, not compensating for it. Under Peñal-
ver’s four-factors approach, a colluding judge need not fear their de-
cision being overturned or any apparent sanctions; the only material 
consequence of coordination would be an aggrieved party ’s com-
pensation.326 Peñalver alternatively argues—effectively—that judi-
cial self-dealing should violate the Due Process Clause and trigger 
criminal prosecution in egregious cases.327 His focus on the different 
incentives behind coordination and self-dealing, however, misses 
the point. Both acts of judicial misconduct compromise the justice 
system and—more importantly—place private property rights at 
risk. 
Establishing coordination among the judiciary and another 
branch is not a rudimentary process. The reviewing judge is placed 
in a very difficult position; accusing another judge of self-dealing is 
one thing but accusing multiple governmental entities of conspiring 
with one another requires a good deal of circumstantial evidence and 
guesswork.328 
 
 324 See id. at 332–33 ([J]udges have relatively little incentive to deprive a pri-
vate property owner of property because it is more difficult for those judge to 
capture the benefits associated with the deprivations . . . . [J]udges are less likely 
to engage in self-dealing . . . .”). 
 325 As a cursory example, perhaps a few zealous government officials realize 
they cannot garner the votes to officially adopt the UPC provision discussed in 
supra Part III.B. Consequently, they approach the judges sitting on the state su-
preme court to garner sympathy for their cause. One can plausibly envision the 
judges colluding with the officials to adopt the UPC provision. A coordinated 
agreement to change property law could be in effect for months—if not years—
in advance of an opportunity to capitalize on a private dispute; it does not have to 
arise when the state becomes an interested party in the litigation. 
 326 See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 328–29. 
 327 See id. at 329–31. 
 328 See Krotoszynski, supra note 281, at 766. 
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B. The Underinvestment Problem 
Peñalver’s primary concern with judicial takings is consequent 
underinvestment in legal representation: Property owners who know 
they may be compensated for a judicial taking in the future may un-
derinvest in legal counsel at the outset of litigation.329 Consequently, 
plaintiff property owners are less likely to present state court judges 
with proper precedent off which to base sound decisions.330 Of 
course, this leads to a host of externalities, most notably being that 
other property owners not parties to the suit may be deprived of their 
own property rights while the erroneous precedent stands (e.g., the 
right to accretions).331 Presumably, these affected property owners 
would all have a valid judicial takings claim. 
Although Peñalver’s underinvestment concerns certainly have 
merit, some counterarguments are worth noting. First, a few hours 
of any lawyer’s service are still expensive to the average Ameri-
can.332 The tangible present benefits of reduced legal fees may offset 
the intangible future costs of underinvestment. Additionally, Peñal-
ver fears that “lower priced, lower quality law firms will be able to 
outcompete higher priced, higher quality law firms,”333 but is that 
really a bad thing? Lower priced does not always equal lower qual-
ity. Many lawyers have low rates simply because they aren’t expe-
rienced or well-connected—they might still have excellent legal 
minds.334 Indeed, younger, cheaper lawyers looking to establish 
themselves may work harder for their clients than their senior coun-
terparts. It follows that, in addition to saving their clients’ money, 
underinvestment may help young lawyers secure precious business 
 
 329 Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 337. 
 330 See id. 
 331 Id. at 337–38. 
 332 See Michael Zuckerman, Is There Such Thing as an Affordable Lawer? 
ATLANTIC (May 30, 2014) https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2014/05/is-there-such-a-thing-as-an-affordable-lawyer/371746/. 
 333 Id. at 341–42. 
 334 In fact, “[h]istorically, most attorneys in the United States have created 
their own jobs by establishing solo and small law firms . . . . Attorney de-
mographics confirm that the majority of lawyers in private practice are self-em-
ployed.” Luz E. Herrera, Training Lawyer-Entrepreneurs, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 
887, 889 (2012). 
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opportunities.335 Again, the premise behind Peñalver’s underinvest-
ment argument is sound—but there are some counterbalancing pol-
icy considerations. 
To mitigate the underinvestment problem, Peñalver proposes 
that comparative and contributory fault be introduced into the com-
pensation scheme for judicial takings: A client that fails to bring rel-
evant precedent to a court’s attention would “suffer some percentage 
reduction” from the compensation to which he is entitled under the 
Takings Clause.336 Under due process, such a client would be denied 
a remedy altogether—similar to a contributory negligence stand-
ard.337 There are several glaring problems with this remedial ap-
proach. For one, it seems arbitrary to ascribe a “percentage of fault” 
for omission of some particular precedent.338 The relevancy of prec-
edent is unique to the case-at-hand, and a judge’s subjective dispo-
sition towards the precedent could cost a client thousands of dollars. 
Additionally, clients should not be punished for the negligence of 
counsel. Even highly qualified lawyers who put in long hours of re-
search may fail to uncover important precedent at times. Thus, even 
where a client does make a substantial investment in counsel, the 
remedy to which he is justly entitled could still be abated or—under 
due process—abrogated completely. It follows that fear of compar-
ative/contributory fault might ironically encourage overinvestment 
in legal representation. Lawyers (and law students) would welcome 
these extra billable hours, but clients certainly wouldn’t. 
Peñalver himself proffers another notable aversion to using com-
parative/contributory fault: It could spread into traditional takings. 
More specifically, “[comparative/contributory fault] might be ex-
panded to cover ordinary takings cases where a well-connected con-
stituent had failed to mount any political resistance against a regu-
lation.”339 If this were to occur, landowners would be galvanized to 
resist new property law as a preemptive strike against a future un-
satisfactory takings verdict.340 Although citizen involvement in the 
 
 335 See id. at 897–98 (discussing benefits of providing smaller low-cost ser-
vices). 
 336 Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 363. 
 337 See id. at 364. 
 338 See id. at 363. 
 339 Id. at 363. 
 340 See id. 
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legislative process should generally be encouraged, a “scorched 
earth”341 approach from fearful property owners could inhibit utili-
tarian legislation. This foreboding, while speculative, should not be 
discounted; a new remedial modus operandi that is “a concept is 
quite foreign to takings jurisprudence”342 naturally carries substan-
tial risk. 
Peñalver illustrates the underinvestment problem by hypothesiz-
ing the outcome of Stop the Beach had the U.S. Supreme Court not 
been presented with the binding state precedent from Martin v. 
Busch.343 If the Solicitor General (or the Court’s clerks) had not 
brought Martin to the Court ’s attention, the Court might have over-
looked the State’s right to artificial avulsions and (wrongly) ruled 
for the property owners.344 In this instance, the plurality may very 
well have charged the Florida Supreme Court with committing a ju-
dicial taking.345 Moreover, by “taking” the restored beach from the 
State (or the public), the U.S. Supreme Court would have conceiva-
bly “committed a judicial taking of its own”!346 This is a frightening 
yet very plausible scenario that adds a new twist to the procedural 
judicial takings conundrum. Should the U.S. Supreme Court not 
grant a rehearing in light of Martin, how would the Court’s judicial 
taking be reviewed? As Peñalver avers, “[w]ho is to police judicial 
takings by the highest judicial body?”347 
Equally disconcerting, the State would have no apparent remedy 
under the Takings Clause in Peñalver’s Stop the Beach/Martin hy-
pothetical.348 Damages would not restitute the public ’s loss of access 
to the beaches. The only proper remedy would be invalidation of the 
decision, which of course sounds like a job for the Due Process 
Clause. This remedial issue captures one of the most disconcerting 
aspects of a judicial takings doctrine: If a court rules that private 
property rights do not exist, the private property owners may seek 
compensation; if, however, the court rules for the private property 
 
 341 See id. 
 342 Id. 
 343 See id. at 349–50. 
 344 Id. at 349. 
 345 Id. 
 346 Id. 
 347 Id. 
 348 See id. at 349–50. 
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owners—abrogating public property rights in the process—the pub-
lic has no apparent recourse. In essence, federal judges are protect-
ing private property owners from renegade state judges but are not 
protecting the public from those same judges. 
C. Underlying Criticisms of Peñalver & Strahilevitz’s Article 
Peñalver segues from his Stop the Beach/Martin hypothetical to 
a proposed procedural due process test that would purportedly frus-
trate underinvestment in legal counsel.349 In so doing, Peñalver toys 
with the idea of invalidating the claims of non-party property owners 
that fail to intervene or file an amicus brief in the original suit.350 
Such a radical measure entails serious constitutional and fairness 
concerns that are beyond the scope of this Article. There is no ques-
tion, however, that extending contributory fault to non-party claim-
ants would open a pandora’s box of new issues. For one thing, it is 
naive to assume that at-risk property owners are closely following 
court dockets. Particularly in larger jurisdictions, there are too many 
cases today for property owners to sift through, let alone consult 
with counsel about. More importantly, placing an affirmative burden 
on non-party property owners to intercede in an outside case would 
greatly lower the bar for what constitutes a “reasonable opportunity 
to be heard”—or satisfactory due process.351 Such a burden would 
contravene the popular conviction that “everyone deserves their fair 
day in court.” 
 
 349 See id. at 350 (“[T]here [is] an alternative to this possibility of merry-go-
round litigation . . . . Due process provides a sensible framework for considering 
these issues.”). The reasoning behind the procedural due process test offered by 
Peñalver is difficult to grasp. The gist of Peñalver’s argument appears to be that a 
Matthews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) test balancing a property owner’s in-
vestment in counsel with the value of the interests at stake would promote effi-
ciency and mitigate the underinvestment problem. See id. at 350–51. Peñalver, 
however, does not clarify the scope of this test or how it should be implemented 
in conjunction with his four-factors approach. Indeed, it is not clear exactly what 
Peñalver is proposing here at all. 
 350 See id. at 351–52. 
 351 Peñalver actually bolsters this point with his own policy arguments. See id. 
at 352. (“Because property law is designed to promote secure investments, the law 
hesitates to impose on owners an affirmative burden to remain constantly vigilant 
about shifting legal doctrines that may affect their rights.”). 
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Despite detailing how his proposed remedial safeguards could 
accommodate non-party property owners, Peñalver glosses over the 
more fundamental procedural obstacles that non-party judicial tak-
ing claims must overcome.352 Peñalver (accurately) prognosticates 
that Williamson County shouldn’t keep non-party judicial takings 
claims from reaching state court but does not explain how state 
courts would handle these claims.353 As established above, state 
court systems are not designed to facilitate judicial takings; fortu-
nately, the U.S. Supreme Court recently opened the door to federal 
judicial taking claims by overruling the state-litigation requirement 
of Williamson County.354 Federal jurisdiction over judicial takings 
claims, however, poses its own practical and federalism concerns.355 
When viewed in context with these broader, more palpable issues, 
underinvestment in legal representation seems like a somewhat triv-
ial problem for Peñalver to dwell on. The appeal of his four-factor 
approach would be stronger if he spent more time addressing how it 
would mitigate the procedural challenges and political impacts of 
judicial takings. 
Peñalver deserves credit for proposing such a unique compro-
mise between the Takings Clause and due process; his effort to har-
monize private and public property interests is certainly admirable. 
In this author’s opinion, however, Peñalver tries too hard to appease 
advocates for private property rights. For example, one of the key 
“implications” of Peñalver’s four-factor approach is that takings 
claimants will enjoy a much higher success rate than due process 
claimants.356 Accordingly, Peñalver takes a notably defensive stance 
towards the odds of prevailing on due process grounds,357 when he 
should be accentuating the positives of a low-success rate for due 
process claims. 
 
 352 See id. at 361–62. 
 353 See id. (citing Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of 
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)). 
 354 See supra Part III.A. 
 355 See supra Parts III.A, III.B. 
 356 Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 355–56. 
 357 See id. at 360 (“Although the argument that a state action is arbitrary under 
the rational basis test is usually thought to be virtually impossible for a claimant 
to win, there are a number of reasons to think it would not be a futile argument to 
make . . . .”). 
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Consider the consequences of a high success rate for judicial 
takings claims. Proponents warn that courts manipulate the system 
to abrogate private property rights,358 but an easy path to compensa-
tion could actually lead property owners to manipulate the judiciary. 
Abundant judicial takings claims would exhaust court resources and 
present numerous externalities. Most significantly, fear of commit-
ting a taking would discourage judges from modifying property law 
to meet societal demands. Peñalver gets so caught up in the nuances 
of his proposal that he loses sight of these great social costs. Phrased 
differently, Peñalver fails to convince this author that the benefits a 
compensatory judicial takings remedy offers private property own-
ers outweighs the costs it imposes on the public. 
Peñalver equates judicial takings to “a car [ ] careening off the 
road.”359 The tense, nebulous opinion issued in Stop the Beach cer-
tainly lends credence to this metaphor. While, however, Peñalver 
purports that his conciliatory approach would crash the car “into the 
bushes [rather] than into a crowded café,”360 this author believes that 
it ’s not too late to navigate the car back onto the road. A firm com-
mitment from the U.S. Supreme Court to regulate judicial takings 
under the Due Process Clause would go a long way towards steering 
the car in the right direction. Hopefully, the Stop the Beach plurality 
will read this Article and react accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
Stop the Beach was supposed to shed some light over the per-
plexing issue of judicial takings. Instead, the divided, inchoate opin-
ion offers more questions than answers. How the plurality’s judicial 
takings doctrine would function in practice is not entirely clear, but 
some of its consequences are. Due process offers a practical alterna-
tive for courts to employ that nullifies or mitigates these 
 
 358 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 61, at 1544 (“By exempting courts from 
taking protections, we create an imbalance that invites the state to attempt to ac-
complish through the judiciary what it cannot accomplish through other branches 
of government . . . . By applying the takings protections to the judiciary, we en-
courage courts to be more sensitive to the impact that their decisions have on 
property holders and thereby protect the values embedded in the takings protec-
tions.”). 
 359 Id. at 368. 
 360 Id. 
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consequences. The familiar, inherently broad Due Process Clause 
already plays a pivotal role in takings jurisprudence, and the Su-
preme Court would be well grounded in adapting it in lieu of the 
judicial takings doctrine proposed in Stop the Beach. 
